Things That Need 'Some Splanin'

Things That Need ‘Splanin’ [to quote Ricky Ricardo]

P. Schultz

July 30, 2012

            Here are some interesting passages from a book entitled Do Not Ask What Good We Do by Robert Draper.

This one is about the Reverend Emanuel Cleaver, chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus.

“….the greatest emotional challenge for E.C….involved his disappointment in the Obama administration. The CBC chairman and his colleagues had met with the president and his chief of staff, Bill Daley, more than once to protest the White House’s supine response to the Republican agenda. During the H.R. 1 program-slashing debate, Cleaver told the president, ‘Look, I was mayor of Kansas City. The community development block grant program? Huge for me. That is how I got infrastructure projects funded….’ And yet Obama’s own budget had proposed a $300 million reduction in the block grant program.

“Of late, Cleaver…had been conferring with his good friend and fellow Texan Jeb Hensarling, along with Paul Ryan and Appropriations subcommittee chairwoman Jo Ann Emerson, about a project that would redirect federal funds in grant-making agencies to the districts that had been most persistently impoverished. Many of these were white districts, like Emerson’s. The three Republicans were enthusiastic about working with Cleaver. Boehner seemed open to it as well….But when Cleaver brought the matter up to Barack Obama, the former CBC member was less than encouraging. Not only did Obama believe such a bill was unlikely to pass during the 112^th Congress; he also preferred that Cleaver not try to do so, for fear that it would complicate his ongoing negotiations with the Republicans.

“And now this eleventh hour debt ceiling compromise. When Cleaver scanned the outline of it…,he could see that it was of a piece with previous Obama White House capitulations. As he would say later, ‘It is hard to condemn the president for hope.’ But this plan…was sure to fail: ‘Stevie Wonder could see it coming.’ The following morning, August 1,…the reverend wrote: ‘This deal is a sugar-coated Satan sandwich. If you lift the bun, you will not like what you see.’” [pp. 255-56]

This next one is about Boehner and his relationship with Obama and with members of his own party.

“At a conference in late July, Boehner had led off by describing how his talks with Obama indicated that the president was willing to make big concessions on spending and entitlement reform. Raul Labrador immediately went to the mike and said, ‘I have to tell you, I feel a whole lot better than I did thirty minutes ago. Thank you for sharing the information with us. And I urge you to keep doing that in the future so that we don’t have to learn about it in the newspaper.’

“After the conference, a number of senior members thanked the frequently contrarian Idaho freshman for his show of appreciation. But they were missing the point – which was that Boehner’s reticence was an ongoing concern to the Tea Party mavericks like Labrador who had come to Washington innately distrusting both its customs and the leaders who practiced them. One monologue by Boehner had hardly quelled all suspicions.

“Around the time of Labrador’s remarks, four of Boehner’s closest pals in the House….contacted Barry Jackson and told the chief of staff that they needed a meeting with the speaker right away.

“’John may not see what’s going on, but we do,’ they told Jackson. ‘Cantor’s staff is running around telling people that Boehner actually told Cantor to walk out of the Biden talks because Boehner was mad that Cantor was getting all the ink. Bullshit like that.’

“’That’s what Cantor and Ryan want,’ Jackson smirked. ‘They see a world where it’s Mitch McConnell [as Senate majority leader], Speaker Cantor, a Republican president, and then Paul Ryan can do whatever he wants to do. It’s not about this year. It’s about getting us to 2012, defeating the president, and Boehner being disgraced.’ That, said the chief of staff, was Cantor and Ryan’s ‘Young Guns’ vision of a better world.” [pp237-238]

When I was much younger, people called such activities “shenanigans.” I did not know then nor do I know now exactly what this word means but I do know that our politicians engage in “shenanigans” to the detriment of the country. I would imagine that their behavior has something to do with their egos, with their ambition. James Madison, in Federalist #51, labeled this stuff “the defect of better motives,” following a policy of getting “ambition to counteract ambition” and, thereby or allegedly advancing the public good even absent good motives. I may be wrong but it seems to me that “the defect of better [or good] motives” is hard to supply and that ambition does not seem adequate to the task.  As Ricky Ricardo use to say to Lucy: “You need to do some ‘splanin!”

Jobs You Say? Maybe

How Congress Works – Or Doesn’t

P. Schultz

July 28, 2012

“Then Ingleside’s city manager, …Jim Gray [said]: ‘You mentioned jobs….Ingleside [Tx] right now is probably the largest job creation area in this region. But it’s a small community, and about ninety percent of the people who work here live elsewhere. The infrastructure costs are borne by the city.”

            "The city manager was referring to the fact that Ingleside had been home of a naval base that was….to be closed in 2005….The Ingleside port remained active, but the federal funds promised from the base closure program had not materialized. Gray continued: ‘We have a chance to put six thousand jobs in this area. We are a job creation area! And we’ve heard all this talk about what the government isn’t going to do – but I’ve got a $15 million sewer plant and a $15 million road I need and that doesn’t count [some other things I need]….Do we put it all on the backs of our taxpayers? Or do we come to you for help, when you were elected not to spend money?”

            "The freshman [congressman, Blake Farenthold] seemed paralyzed for a moment. ‘You’ve got a good answer, you tell me,’ he finally said. ‘But government runs up the cost of everything you do.’” [pp. 218-219]

            This is taken from a book, Do Not Ask What Good We Do by Robert Draper on the House of Representatives and especially on the House session from 2010 to 2012, focusing on those representatives who were newly elected to the House and were, many of them, beholden to the Tea Party movement. Interesting exchange and note should be taken that the freshman here does not know what to say to the city manager. The account continues as follows:

            “Jim Gray lingered for a few minutes after the event broke up and Farenthold departed to another ‘Coffee with Your Congressman’ event somewhere else in the district. The city manager acknowledged he was a steadfast Republican, and that he and the town’s eight thousand voters ‘may have swung Blake’s election.’ At the same time, Gray admitted that the freshman’s predecessor Ortiz…had been quite helpful to Ingleside in securing millions of dollars in road construction and economic development funds." [p. 221]

            Good book. One of the best on Congress I have read. Not boring for the most part.

An Election? Yes. A Choice? No.

An Election? Yes. A Choice? No.

P. Schultz

July 27, 2012

            As I have written here previously, the most important event of this presidential election has already taken place: Two, status quo, “mainstream” candidates, Mr. White Bread and Mr. Almost White Bread, have been nominated for the presidency and are considered the only viable and/or legitimate candidates for that office. This is evident from the largely meaningless rhetoric that has characterized the “campaign” so far. And if you want more evidence, consider the following from the NY Times, July 27, 2012. Enjoy.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/27/opinion/candidates-cower-on-gun-control.html?hp

Rumsfeld: By His Own Rules

Rumsfeld: By His Own Rules

p. Schultz

July 25, 2012

            I recently finished a book, a biography of Donald Rumsfeld, entitled By His Own Rules. The title reflects the fact that Rumsfeld developed “his own rules” for life. As a matter of fact, these “rules” were not his; rather, he wrote stuff down, copied stuff, that others had written and adopted them as “his.” No big deal.

            But it was only after, about a week after I had finished this book that I realized that Rumsfeld was merely a Republican, twenty-first century version of Robert Strange McNamara, who was Secretary of Defense under JFK and LBJ until he was “promoted” to the World Bank when he began to dissent on Johnson’s policies regarding the Vietnam War. The details are easy to get lost in, as is illustrated by the author of the Rumsfeld biography, who never once makes the connection, never sees the similarities between the two men. Again, no big deal.

            Here is an outline of what I mean. Like McNamara, Rumsfeld came in as Secretary of Defense to revamp, even “revolutionize” the Department of Defense. And like McNamara, this “revolution” was undertaken in the name of “flexibility” and “efficiency.” And, finally, like McNamara, Rumsfeld needed a showcase for the bona fides of his “revolution;” so, like McNamara’s Vietnam, Rumsfeld had Iraq. And it must be said that Rumsfeld’s results have been a lot like McNamara’s results, not so good. This just might be a big deal.

            Of course, if I am the only one to see the similarities here, then it might be that this is just a figment of my imagination and I should try to go to sleep. But as no one, either Democrat or Republican, has seen fit to take on Rumsfeld and his “revolution,” it just might be that I am not seeing things or hearing things that go bump in the night. And wouldn’t it be worthwhile to know that a Secretary of Defense in the twenty-first century was repeating the activities, recreating the policies of a failed Secretary of Defense of the 1960s? And wouldn’t it be worthwhile to ask: Why has no one noticed?

The Politics of Empire

The Politics of Empire

P. Schultz

July 19, 2012

            Here is a passage from a book by Edith Foster, cited below, on Pericles and his commitment to imperialism and empire. I don’t know but this sounds familiar to me, as if it could be used to describe the United States and its foreign policy post WWII. It is a book I recommend as it provides a foil to the arguments of some “Straussians” or “Neo-Cons” that the pursuit and maintenance of an empire is “noble,” even though bound to fail. Foster makes a persuasive argument that Thucydides sees imperialism as only noble when considered in the abstract, so to speak; that is, absent considerations of just what is required to obtain and maintain an empire. As Foster’s last line has it: “I suggest that [Thucydides’] analysis cannot be a matter of indifference to us.” [p. 220]

“Thucydides showed in Pericles’ speeches that the power warfare can potentially provide had become for Pericles the aim of Athenian existence. Despite his exact knowledge of Athens and Athenian war resources, and despite his personal experiences of war, Pericles spoke of Athenian warfare as great, unique, and of never-ending importance and grandeur. A psychological progress has occurred, in which Pericles had left behind all other attachments and become attached to a sense of Athens’ unlimited future. As we have discussed, this progress has several foundations, but one of the most important was Athens’ unprecedented growth after the Persian Wars. The power and resources Pericles both inherited and helped to create allowed him to leave behind all other considerations, and to seek significance in Athens’ empire alone. It is to defend the empire that he urges the Athenians to fight the war with Sparta, and the possession of the empire and its resources, as we have just reviewed, caused him to believe that Athens would prevail.” [p. 218, Thucydides, Pericles, and Periclean Imperialism.]

Why They/We Fail, Part III

Why They/We Fail, Part III

P. Schultz

July 15, 2012

            An example of blindness: “He [Rumsfeld] still thought that if the anti-terrorism campaign stalled in Afghanistan, U.S. forces could and should do something elsewhere.” [By His How Rules, Bradley Graham, p. 301]

            This reminds me of the old joke of the man who is looking around for something at night and another man asks him what he is looking for. “I lost my car keys,” the man says. “Where did you lose them?” the second man asks. “Well, over there on the other sidewalk.” “Well,” the second man asks. “Why are you looking for them over here then?” “Well,” the first man responds. “This is where the street light is.”

            Rumsfeld is so blind that he thinks it makes sense that if our military actions fail in Afghanistan, we should attack somewhere else. Where? Well, who knows but somewhere! “’If the initial U.S. military action is not confidence-inspiring, it could undermine our entire effort,’ [Rumsfeld’s] memo warned. U.S. strikes should be designed to produce ‘impressive results.’ Expressing doubts about the quality of available information and analysis for Afghanistan, the memo suggested targeting al Qaeda forces and assets ‘in more than one country, including some outside the Middle East.’ It also advised hitting ‘at least one non-al Qaeda target.’ Iraq was mentioned as an example.” [p. 293] If this is not evidence of blindness, it would be hard to say what would be.

            As this biography makes clear, Rumsfeld had no idea that an attack like that of 9/11 was forthcoming. “In the months before September 11, Rumsfeld had talked a lot about terrorism. In congressional testimony, news conferences, and other forums, he had regularly cited it as one of the new threats that the Defense Department wasn’t adequately organized or prepared to deal with. And yet he hadn’t made counterterrorism operations a priority, even in the face of warnings by top CIA officials that al Qaeda might be about to launch a damaging attack.” [p. 286]

As we use to say in New Jersey, talk is cheap, at least until you hire an attorney. And of course those with insight would not have wasted time talking about terrorism; they would have acted. Some might even have begun to wonder how our actions were contributing to terrorism.

            And then there is this from Tom Robbins, a novelist sometimes cited here. Consider the following quote cited in an earlier blog:

“I happen to have been in the air on the morning of September 11, flying out of New Orleans. When the pilot announced that we couldn’t be assigned a gate in Atlanta due to ‘an aircraft accident in New York,’ I instantly turned to my paramour and said, ‘Terrorists!’ Just blurted it out. Our foreign policy made such an attack inevitable, and that may have been its most tragic aspect: it was entirely preventable – not by better intelligence gathering but by a more honorable, less arrogant American role in foreign affairs.” [pp. 124-25, Conversations with Tom Robbins]

Isn’t it interesting that even without all the information that Rumsfeld and others had that Robbins was not surprised by the attacks of 9/11 at all. “Our foreign policy made such an attack inevitable….” This might be classified as insight and we might begin to wonder why a novelist and not the well informed Secretary of Defense would possess this. Perhaps, as suggested in an earlier blog in this series, information is more blinding than illuminating, that it is imagination that makes insight possible. Nor is Robbins the only example of this phenomenon. Graham Greene in the early 50s saw America’s involvement in Vietnam, what its character would be like [My Lai included], and what its denouement would be. As Voegelin wrote: “Pragmatic rationality of action, disregarding the participation in right order, is a dangerous indulgence….”

Indeed, that would seem to be the case for Rumsfeld who was reduced, after the attacks of 9/11, to recommending bombing, somewhere, sometime, perhaps even Iraq. Just attack, just bomb, somewhere and quickly. And this is called strategy and Rumsfeld is considered a “realist.” Wow!

Why They/We Fail, Part II

Why They Fail, continued

P. Schultz

July 15, 2012

            In a previous blog, I proposed a project or rather a couple of questions: Why does our government fail so often? And: Why do those men who seem to be and actually are quite competent fail so often? Well, I think I have found part of an answer to the second question and I found it in a place I would not thought to have found it, in a commentary on the history of what I call political philosophy, a history written by Eric Voegelin. Here are some of the relevant quotes. 

            “Pragmatic rationality of action, disregarding the participation in right order, is a dangerous indulgence that may grow into an irrational force destructive of order.” [The World of the Polis, p. 41]

            “The strict rationality of a struggle for power, without regard for the order of Hellenic society, had indeed become the standard of action in political practice.” [ibid.]

            “From the causality of rational action, as understood by Thucydides, nothing could result but a power struggle to the death. Restoration of order could only come from the soul that had ordered itself by attunement to the divine measure. This entirely different conception of history was Plato’s.” [p. 43]

            What is striking about men like Rumsfeld and McNamara, but also even Dick Cheney, is their rationality, as Voegelin has it, their “pragmatic rationality,” their unquestioning faith in “rational action.” Rumsfeld and McNamara were what might be called “information junkies.” They desired to amass as much information as they could, thinking that by doing so they would know what to do, not thinking that by amassing information they were actually blinding themselves to what I like to call “real reality.”

            What follows from amassing information and acting on it are what are called “progress reports.” These reports invariably find that “progress” is being made – which is not all that surprising given that they are called “progress reports.” Again and again, during the Vietnam War, the progress reports indicated that progress was being made, for example, in the “body counts” or in the number of Vietnamese who had been “relocated.” Insofar as they could be, these progress reports were accurate. Still, they were blinding. For example, no progress report indicated – or even could indicate – that something like the Tet Offensive was about to occur. This would have required insight and that is not what progress reports are about or what they provide.

So the blindness is in a real sense self-imposed because these men, while seeming to have “sight,” have no insight. Insight, as the word implies, requires looking within. “Information” is that which is available on the surface and as this “data” is amassed it actually becomes harder for and less likely that human beings will look within. And it could be that insight is the work of the imagination and, of course, if one attribute helps to define “pragmatic rationality” it is a distrust of, even the dismissal of the imagination. [Read your Machiavelli, central chapter of the Prince, where Machiavelli dismisses the usefulness of those who have based their political philosophy on “imagined republics.”] But if it is the imagined that provides insight, then “pragmatic rationality” or “strict rationality” is blinding rather than illuminating.  And those who call themselves “realists” are anything but. They are bound to fail because they have lost touch with reality even while thinking that they have not.