Obama's Virtues

 

Obama’s Virtues: His Political and Military Calculations

Peter Schultz

 

                  “Yemen and the United States, 2010: As thousands of US troops deployed and redeployed to Afghanistan, the covert campaign in undeclared battlefields was widening. US drone strikes were hitting Pakistan weekly, while JSOC forces were on the ground in Somalia and Yemen and pounding the latter with air strikes. All the while, al Qaeda affiliated in those countries were gaining strength. When I met with Hunter, who worked with the JSOC under Bush and continued to work in counterterrorism under the Obama administration, I asked him what changes had taken place from one administration to the next. He quickly shot back: ‘There’s no daylight. If anything, JSOC operations have intensified under this administration, there’s been a greater intensity in what their being asked to do, where they are being asked to do it and how they’re being asked to do it,’ he told me. ‘There are things transpiring now, around the globe, that would be unthinkable to the Bush administration, not just because of vocal opposition within the cabinet, or within the Pentagon, but because they would not have the ultimate support of the president. In this administration, the president has made a political and military calculation – and this is his prerogative – that it is best to let the Joint Special Operations Command run wild, like a mustang, in pursuit of the objectives that [Obama] has set.’”

 

From Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield, Jeremy Scahill, p. 350.

 

When you see the world as a battlefield, as our presidents have consistently done, then all the world’s inhabitants, civilian as well as military, are fair game, so to speak. As one Yemeni said in the aftermath of the massacre at al Majalah, where fourteen women and twenty-one children were incinerated by US missiles: “If they kill innocent children and call them as Qaeda, then we are all al Qaeda. If children are terrorists, then we are all terrorists.”

 

Exactly. When you turn the world into a battlefield, all humans are potential enemies and massacres are inevitable. 

The Decline of McCarthyism?

 

The Decline of McCarthyism?

Peter Schultz

 

                  The last chapter in Athan Theoharis’s book The Seeds of Repression is entitled “The Decline of McCarthyism.” With the advent of the Eisenhower administration, the argument is that McCarthyism was undermined because, among other things, “the Eisenhower administration had set out to prove that negotiation – that McCarthyite bête noire – was neither inherently beneficial to the Soviets nor inherently harmful to American interests.” And, as a result, “By 1955, the public was coming to realize that one did not have to call for the annihilation of communism to be an anti-communist.” [190 & 191]

 

                  And Theoharis concludes his book as follows: “Eisenhower’s election and his subsequent foreign policy decisions reduced the effectiveness of McCarthyite charges and, dramatically, though unintentionally, revealed McCarthyism to be an irresponsible force in American politics. McCarthy’s former image of objectivity was thereby destroyed. Yet to the extent that absolute security and containment remained basic objectives of United States policy, post-1955 foreign policy debate remained narrowly circumscribed. In that sense, the tactics of Joseph McCarthy and his supporters of … charging leaders with being ‘soft on communism’ continued to be an essential part of national politics. The immediate and direct impact of McCarthyism might have been reduced, but even today it lingers on as a conservative force in American political life.” [192]

 

                  So, I would put it this way: the vicious circle of American politics was unbroken, even though it seemed a bit less vicious thanks to the Eisenhower administration and the destruction of Joseph McCarthy. It might even be speculated that the Eisenhower administration destroyed McCarthy personally in order to preserve a more respectable kind of “McCarthyism” or anti-communism. Eisenhower, et. al., could make “McCarthyism” respectable by attacking and defeating Joe McCarthy. And in doing so, the circular character of American politics was reinforced, thereby narrowly circumscribing United States foreign policy and any debate that arose around it. The basic objectives, as Theoharis noted, remained the same, absolute security and containment. Or as I would put it, the basic objective, US hegemony, remained the same and had acquired a cloak of respectability that it could not don so long as there was the spectacle presided over by Joe McCarthy. The empire needed some new clothes, as it were. But while the vicious circle of American politics might not have looked vicious, it led eventually to the war in Vietnam and its viciousness. The vicious circle of American politics remained unbroken, with results that should have been predictable.

Ruminations

 

Ruminations

Peter Schultz

 

                  From Athan Theroharis’s Seeds of Repression: In the 1940s, “the Justice Department succeeded in making [the case] for stricter surveillance of federal employees and American communists. This concern over communist ‘espionage’ was fortified by fears … of communists in labor unions, racial incidents, and other radical activities … in 1945-46.” [125]

 

                  Question: which was more problematic, communism or labor strikes, racial incidents, or other radical activities? The latter were more problematic than the former because the latter threatened more directly the status quo. It is crucial to keep this distinction in mind if you are to understand the political because it points to the repression that is endemic to politics generally.

 

                  Conventionally thinking, engaging in repression to defeat communism is not problematic insofar as communism threatens freedom and, so, once communism is defeated, then freedom is saved. But insofar as the political is innately repressive, then feeding that tendency when combating communism is problematic because such policies reinforce, fortify the repressive character of government as it deals with labor strikes, racial incidents, and other allegedly radical activities. So, even in the face of communist threats, the character of the political, especially its repressive character, needs to be recognized. The political is not repressive only in its communistic manifestation. The political is innately repressive. And defeating communism or Islamofascism or racism will not change that fact. Thinking and acting as if defeating communism or Islamofascism ultimately leads to a viciously circular politics.

 

                  Again, from Theoharis’s Seeds of Repression: “The outbreak of the Korean War put an end to White House efforts to restrain the zeal of the Justice Department. Not only did Korea raise popular fears of a third world war, but it also sharpened popular anxieties about subversion.”

 

                  Clearly, from this description, popular fears and popular anxieties preceded the Korean War. Hence, they are “raised” and “sharpened” by the war. So, internal security was threatened by more than communism, as reflected by a Justice Department press release in July, 1950, calling for “full public cooperation with the FBI.”

 

                  “The forces … most anxious to weaken our internal security are not always easy to identify…. They [include] cleverly camouflaged movements, such as peace groups and civil rights organizations…. It is important to learn to know the enemies of the American way of life.” [141-42]

 

                  But what makes “the American way of life” “vulnerable to its enemies?” Why are those who oppose that way of life able to subvert it? Why are they able to “cleverly camouflage” themselves and their subversions? Do they have satanic powers or is there something fragile, ephemeral even in the American way of life?

 

                  As questions like these are pursued, pretty soon a picture emerges of human societies that are arenas characterized by endless conflict, including conflicts between fundamentally opposed parties, e.g., the God-fearing and the god-less. No wonder that people are fearful and anxious. They should be as life is seen as essentially a war of all against all. If it had not been the Korean War, some other event would have raised popular fears and sharpened popular anxieties, especially because the world is thought to be populated by clever enemies who are difficult to know and even harder to oppose and defeat. And, so, once again, the vicious circularity of American politics is visible. And that viciousness has more to do with America’s most cherished political beliefs and much less to do with fears of communism, Islamofascism, or racism than is conventionally assumed.

Summing Things Up

 

Summing Things Up

Peter Schultz

 

                  There are a couple of ways of summing things up.

 

                  Our elites can’t rectify our problems or solve them because they don’t realize the problems are the results or our most cherished fundamental beliefs. Until that is realized, our elites will just “spin their wheels” or whirl around in vicious circles, with no way out.

 

                  Or: Our problems can’t be solved politically because it is not recognized that it is politics that lies at the roots of our problems. The political is always and everywhere problematic, including even healthy political orders such as great, long-established empires or public spirited, participatory republics. Plato’s Republic is riddled with problems it cannot solve, and Aristotle’s best regime is also riddled with problems it cannot solve. To think there is a final, ideal political alternative is one of our most cherished beliefs. 

 

                  This is the implication of Randolph Bourne’s assertion that “War is the health of the state.” In other words, for a state to be healthy, it is should be warlike, which if, of course, problematic. As problematic as is war. So, what kind of health does politics promise?

 

                  What is one of humanity’s most cherished beliefs if it isn’t that politics is capable of ameliorating or redeeming the human condition? But isn’t it clear that politics, e.g., in the form of nation states or Greek city states, is the source of our troubles? What if the people in Belfast or Dublin didn’t think of themselves as Brits or as Irish? What if they thought of themselves as fellow journeyers on an adventure to enjoy the beauty of the world, or just as lovers, rather than as political beings seeking to be good Brits or good Irish? Seems to me that would make for great improvements in the human condition.

The Crisis in Central America

 

Th Crisis in Central America

Peter Schultz

 

                  The following sentence is from the book, Everyone Who Is Gone Is Here: The United States, Central America, the Making of a Crisis,” by Jonathan Blitzer: “… in … 2018, the deterrent effects of [Trump’s policy of] zero tolerance were moot where people were starving.” [379]

 

                  People were starving in Guatemala because climate changes had undermined the agriculture that had been relied upon in Guatemala to keep people alive. “The changing climate was wiping out the region’s crops…. Farmers were abandoning their land.” [377]

 

                  So, obsessing about Trump’s policies, or Obama’s or Biden’s, obscures what was happening and why. People were starving due to climate changes. Treating the situation politically, i.e., as if it could be changed via one policy or another is futile because addressing the situation as an “immigration problem,” as if it could be solved by building a wall – or not, does not address the real problem, changing climates. Thereby, affirming the political merely creates vicious political circles characterized by charges and counter charges of betrayal, racism, criminality, or un-Americanness, with no way out of the crisis. Moreover, not surprisingly, the solutions offered by different administrations do not vary all that much:

 

                  “Obama entered the White House vowing to protect the undocumented and restrain ICE, but deportations increased steadily during his first two years in office. An average of a thousand immigrants were being removed every day, a large share of them the very people the president promised to spare….” [290]

 

                  There you have it: Evidence of the vicious circles that characterize American politics, due to the affirmation of the political, the belief that politics in one form or another can and will ameliorate the human condition. As the crisis in Central America reveals, our problems are not political and, so, they cannot be solved by laws, by walls, by bureaucracies like ICE, by presidents, or by the military. Solving our problems requires rethinking what we take to be reality, seeing the world as it is and not as we wish it to be. And that means, necessarily, rethinking those principles Americans hold most dear. In brief, it requires being “anti-American.” Moral or political virtue needs to be trumped by intellectual virtue, as even Socrates knew so long ago.

 

The Impossible as the Inevitable

 

The Impossible as the Inevitable

Peter Schultz

 

                  “Affirming the political” means, quite simply, embracing the impossible while thinking of it as the inevitable.

 

                  The following is from Seeds of Repression: Harry Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism, by Athan Theoharis:

 

                  “The … rhetoric of post war foreign policy begat a popular obsession for achieving a total victory over communism ….  The failure to do so would directly threaten American liberties and … subvert … American moral leadership in the world. Accordingly, the Truman administration’s foreign policy [was] judged in terms of effectiveness in meeting the threat of communism. Since post war rhetoric also popularized the theme of American omnipotence, it [was] believed that an American victory was inevitable – inevitable, that is, so long as the country possessed the necessary will and resolve. The Soviet threat per se was not considered major; Soviet gains were thought merely the result of administration errors or inaction.” [98]

 

                  The results of United States’ post war policies may be summarized as follows: An intensification of the Cold War and an intensification of domestic politics revolving around charges and counter charges of betrayal and subversion.

 

                  In other words, affirming the political creates and intensifies political warfare, creating vicious political circles both at home and abroad. And this warfare occurs, ironically, despite a broad-based consensus about ends – total victory over communism – and means – vast military power, surveillance programs, covert and limited war, loyalty oaths, and “going to dark side” via torture and assassination. Thus, as US policies failed as they did in China or Korea, the “McCarthyites” charged the Truman administration with selling out to communism while betraying traditional American values; while Truman, et. al., indicted the McCarthyites with subverting civil liberties and civility generally.  And, so, vicious circles of such charges and counter charges were created which fed political warfare without avoiding political failures, like “losing China” or Cuba.

 

                  Consider, for example, that neither the Truman administration nor the McCarthyites came up with loyalty programs that worked. Truman’s policies were so broad that they punished both the loyal and the disloyal, hopelessly confusing the two. And the McCarthyites’ policies suffered from the same defects and for the same reason: The goal was to wipe out disloyalty completely. That goal, like the goal of total victory over communism, was unachievable but was seen as inevitably successful “so long as the country possessed the necessary will and resolve.” So, of course, as the policies failed, as they had to do, charges and counter charges of betrayal and subversion, communist inspired or not, became common and were popularly embraced. There was no alternative rhetoric or political discourse.  

 

                  And political failure was the result both at home and abroad. Abroad, the Cold War as seen by both Truman, et. al., and the McCarthyites served to fortify communism, e.g., in the Soviet Union and China, by creating the image of these nations as allegedly so powerful that they represented the end of history as “the final tyrannies.” Or, as Ronald Reagan put it, these were “evil empires;” that is, nations possessing satanic like powers that could undermine Western civilization. So, just as Bush’s Global War on Terrorism fortified Islamic terrorism, so too did the Cold War fortify communism. Ironic but true.  

 

                  And domestically the Cold War facilitated the rise of McCarthyism, as well as facilitating the creation of what is called “the imperial presidency,” and the fortification of the national security state grounded on institutions like the CIA, the FBI, and the NSA. In other words, the Cold War did not effectively protect American democracy as it was intended to do. It might even be said that the Cold War helped to subvert that democracy insofar as a national security, surveillance state seems anything but democratic.

 

                  Affirming the political, it might be said, leads to political failure because it embraces the impossible as the inevitable, leading to political extremism. And political extremism in the defense of liberty, democracy, or civilization, whether a Western or an Islamic civilization, is a fool’s errand.

 

 

 

Poltics and Vicious Circles

 

Politics and Vicious Circles

Peter Schultz

 

                  One question not asked frequently enough is: What is it possible to do politically? Humans are political animals. They are pointed toward the polis, the political, the assumption being that the polis/ the political is the key to ameliorating, improving, or even perfecting the human condition. Hence, it seems only natural when humans are led to affirm the political, instinctively as it were.

 

                  Harry Truman, et. al., during the Cold War, affirmed the political, arguing that by way of overwhelming military power and a policy of containment, the United States would be able to ameliorate the human condition by defeating communism and establishing an American-inspired worldwide peace. And, yet, when acting the Truman administration and other Cold Warriors found their actions limited, e.g., by the threat of World War III which would, of course, be a nuclear war. So, Truman, et. al., had to compromise, improvise, act prudently. And, as a result, Truman’s actions were easily made to look like “appeasement”, or the result of internal subversion caused by communists in the US government or by communist sympathizers. By affirming the political, by thinking and saying that the United States could defeat communism and bring about world peace, Truman, et. al., created a vicious circle of apocalyptic rhetoric and compromising, improvising, appeasing actions.

 

                  It was easy, therefore, for the “McCarthyites” to attack Truman and the Democrats on grounds of betrayal and selling out because the “McCarthyites” did not need to formulate an alternative to Truman’s Cold War policies. In other words, Truman’s affirmation of the Cold War and its politics allowed the McCarthyites to play the role of realists, of patriotic realists who would actually win the Cold War. In brief, Truman facilitated McCarthyism.

 

                  Because Americans were not offered any alternative to the Cold War, US elites were caught in a vicious circle with no way out. In order to avoid or negate charges of betrayal and selling out, of appeasement, US elites had to become ever more belligerent and war-like, ala’ the Korean War, the Vietnam War, anti-Cuban terrorism, and a super-heated arms race.

 

                  The same phenomenon followed the 9/11 attacks when Bush, et. al., launched the Global War on Terror. By doing so, Bush facilitated the rise of Donald Trump who, like the McCarthyites of Truman’s day, did not need to formulate an alternative course of action to Bush’s GWOT. As the outcome of the GWOT floundered, it was easy for Trump to accuse both the mainstream Republicans and the mainstream Democrats of betrayal, gross incompetence, or the rejection of traditional American values, values that had once “made America great.” Only by embracing those values, Trump argued, could America regain the greatness it once had and defeat its enemies worldwide. In brief, Bush and Obama, mainstream Republicans and Democrats facilitated the rise of Trump. They, like Truman, created a vicious circle and all Trump had to do was dance around it. There was no way out.  

National Security Politics v. Law Enforcement Politics

 

National Security Politics v. Law Enforcement Politics

Peter Schultz

 

                  A politics of national security is decidedly different than what may be called law enforcement politics, two concepts employed, e.g., by the FBI over the course of its history.

 

                  Originally, the FBI was to be a law enforcement agency, that is, an organization that would seek out perpetrators who broke US laws, in order to indict, try, and convict them for their offenses. For example, the FBI was empowered to seek out those who transported stolen vehicles across state lines (the Stolen Vehicle Act), or those who transported women across state lines for immoral purposes (the Mann or White Slave Trade Act).

 

                  Eventually, though, the FBI became a surveillance agency, especially after WW I and Russian Revolution when the Communists rose to power in Russia. That is, the FBI undertook to surveil for purposes of identifying communists and other alleged extremists, not because they had broken any laws and not in order to convict them of crimes, but in order to know who they were and to disrupt their activities or to destroy their organizations, if possible. These groups were seen as threats to national security, whether they engaged in criminal behavior or not. This surveillance function eventually displaced, for the most part, the FBI’s law enforcement function, and was used by J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI to surveil congresspersons, presidents, Supreme Court Justices, journalists, lawyers, educators, and even clergy. No one could escape Hoover’s surveillance regime.  

 

                  But this is no small change and has rather important political implications. Surveillance of alleged extremists for purposes of disruption and/or social ostracism is distinctly different than a law enforcement approach insofar as the latter seeks to justify its actions in courts of law. In an important sense, justice is the goal of law enforcement, whereas with regard to surveillance, when divorced from law enforcement, security, not justice, is the goal. So, a surveillance regime is not constrained by the need to be just because the goal is to deter or destroy, not to convict. Seeking justice constrains power, whereas seeking security liberates power. More power does not mean more justice, while more power does mean more security.   

 

                  More security but less justice. So, surveillance regimes go together very well with targeted killings and especially with “signature strikes.”  Because the goal is national security, not justice, due process is irrelevant in such regimes. Similarly, in surveillance regimes social ostracism or character assassination works well and, again, because the goal isn’t justice, due process is irrelevant. In fact, given that the goal is national security, it is only reasonable or prudent to err on the side of exaggerating potential threats to national security rather than worrying about accurately estimating such threats. If the results are unjust, write them off as “collateral damage” and move on to the next killing. Moreover, dissident opinions or thoughts, even, are sufficient to recommend exposing the “disloyal” insofar as disloyalty threatens national security. “Signature strikes,” that is, assassinations or killings based on impersonal characteristics like location, age, and gender, where the person or persons to be killed are not identified or identifiable, reveal how irrelevant justice is in a surveillance or national security regime. Such a regime is, in principle, totalitarian, has nothing to do with justice, and everything to do with power. That presidents Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden proudly authorized such strikes is revealing of how little justice means to American elites. National security has trumped their sense of justice, while bringing death and destruction worldwide.  

American Political Illusions

 

American Political Illusions

Peter Schultz

 

                  The following is from the book, The FBI and American Democracy: A Brief Critical History, by Athan Theoharis. It is worthy of quoting at length. It is also worthy of consideration for what it tells us about the political and America’s alleged “democracy.”

 

                  “The way in which the FBI operated during the 1940s and 1950s differed radically from the way in which it was viewed at the time – as an apolitical, professional, and disciplined law enforcement agency that respected privacy and First Amendment rights and safeguarded the confidentiality of its files. The radical disparity between myth and reality raises serious questions for a democratic political system based on the rule of law, limited and defined powers, and accountability. How could a law enforcement agency violate with impunity the Fourth Amendment as well as laws banning wiretapping and mail opening? How could FBI officials brazenly affirm the confidentiality of FBI files when, in fact, they selectively released their contents to ideologically sympathetic journalists and members of Congress? How could FBI agents monitor the political activities and personal conduct of members of Congress and of the media? Finally, how could FBI officials monitor the personal activities of presidents and, further, how could they preclude discovery of their practice of sharing information that advanced the partisan interests of a president’s political adversaries?” [p. 105]

 

                  Actually, this passage pretty much tells most of what you should know about the political and about American democracy. As realists claim, politics is about power, not justice. But what the realists do not like to acknowledge, this means that politics is about repression, not freedom, official lawlessness, not the rule of law, and the quest for total social control and visibility, not privacy. Randolph Bourne once wrote that “war is the health of the state;” but he didn’t get to the essence of the political because actually repression is the health of the state. And this becomes quite apparent in times of crises, like war or pandemics or economic dislocations and depressions.

Political Realism, Targeted Killings, Signature Strikes

 

Political Realism, Targeted Killing, Signature Strikes

Peter Schultz

 

                  There is a connection between political realism and targeted killings and signature strikes, which promote the latter even when they are ineffective.

 

                  Political realists think that power is central to political life; that it is at the heart of politics, getting it, maintaining it, and using it. As a result, realists focus on the powerful, that is, the most powerful persons while thinking that if they are defeated, captured, or killed, then they will win, they will be secure because most powerful.

 

                  But, by obsessing over power, realists fail to appreciate the degree to which perceptions of justice lie at the roots of power. Awlaki, the Islamic preacher that Obama has assassinated, was powerful because of the perceived justice of his cause. The same applied to al Shabab in Somalia.

 

                  Killing or capturing the powerful doesn’t get to the roots of insurgencies, which lie in perceptions of injustice and desire for justice. And, therefore, killing the powerful who are deemed just will often prove futile and can never legitimize a counterinsurgency. Hence, realists and realistic policies will never, can never “win hearts and minds.” No counterinsurgency will ever do that unless it offers the insurgents some justice. Without such justice, the counterinsurgents power will be futile. Power doesn’t justify itself.

 

                  Thus, fetishizing about power not only leads frequently to savagery; it also leads to abysmal failures and disgrace.

Nixon, Watergate, and Political Realism

 

Nixon, Watergate, and Political Realism

Peter Schultz

 

                  Although it is commonly argued that Richard Nixon’s paranoia led to his downfall, his politics played a role as well. In some ways, as people have noticed, Nixon’s actions seem odd in response the revelation of the Watergate burglaries. For example, even though he played no part in the burglaries, did not approve them, and did not even know of them until revealed in the press, Nixon almost immediately tried to control the outcome, to cover up the burglaries, rather than uncover what had happened. Why did Nixon act like that when he was innocent?

 

                  Paranoia is one answer, but politics is another. Nixon, like most politicians, saw himself as a realist. That is, he understood how the political world worked, and that in that  world power was indispensable in order to succeed. Thus, the essence of politics is to get and maintain power, and to get and maintain power, cunning and shrewdness are absolutely essential. They are capital political virtues. So, when your power is threatened, as so often and repeatably happens in the political world, the politically realistic response is to defeat your enemies as cunningly and as shrewdly as is necessary. Survival requires power and power is best secured via cunning and shrewdness. These means might involve injustice and/or dishonesty, but they are validated by the end, success.

 

                  Nixon, of course, faced such a threat and, so, without knowing what the burglars or the burglaries were about, he immediately sought to manipulate by covering up what had happened. But this led Nixon to work with and for those men, like John Dean, E. Howard Hunt, and James McCord, who had been involved in the burglaries and who, therefore, had reasons to lay blame on Nixon himself if necessary to protect themselves. On the other hand, if Nixon had decided to uncover the burglaries, to investigate them, he could have learned the truth about Dean’s, Hunt’s, and McCord’s roles in the burglaries; that is, he could have put the blame where it justly belonged. Being a realist, however, Nixon’s politics led him to act as he had always acted, cunningly, shrewdly, and manipulatively, rather than acting justly.

 

                  Had Nixon not been a realist, he might have appreciated that power does not, cannot justify itself. Being cunning, e.g., is not the same thing as being just and, ultimately, politics is about justice. Like any realist, Nixon did not think questions of justice were important and, hence, he never questioned the justice or legitimacy of his cover-up. The justice of his cover-up just wasn’t relevant.

 

                  Ironically, though, by ignoring those questions, Nixon contributed to his own downfall. If Nixon had sought justice rather than power, he might have survived Watergate because he would have been led to expose those responsible for the burglaries and their agendas. Ironically, Nixon’s realism led to his downfall because that realism gave Nixon a distorted view of the political, a view that ignored questions of justice. By ignoring questions of justice, Nixon failed abysmally and was disgraced.

                  A question: How often would entertaining questions of justice have saved the United States from abysmal failures and disgrace? Consider, e.g., the Vietnam War waged by the United States. Or consider the United States’ invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. Or consider the decimation of America’s indigenous peoples. Political realists pride themselves on their “hard-headedness,” on their alleged competence. Yet, ironically, political realists have led the US into quite a few abysmal, disgraceful failures. Maybe political realism is not quite as realistic as it claims to be. If you ever see Richard Nixon, in the great beyond, you might ask him about this possibility.  

Liberal Politics and Totalitarianism

 

Liberal Politics and Totalitarianism

Peter Schultz

 

                  Tim Weiner in his book Enemies on J. Edgar Hoover asserted that “Hoover conflated communism with … homosexuality.” Which led me to wonder: Why or how would anyone conflate a kind of politics with a kind of sexuality? What was going on in the mind of Hoover that led him to conflate communism with homosexuality? What did Hoover perceive to be the connection? It just didn’t make a lot of sense to me.

 

                  But then I wondered: Apparently, Hoover perceived both communism and homosexuality as deviant forms of human behavior because Hoover thought there was a natural order by which humans should live, both politically and sexually. And communism and homosexuality violated that order and, hence, both were deviant and should be stamped out.

 

                  But did Hoover appreciate the implications of his views? That is, because he was focused on communism and homosexuality, he failed to see that, by his views, the challenge, the human problem was not communism or homosexuality but was deviance. That is, it is deviance that needs to be stamped out and once stamping out deviance is the political project, the consequences, the political consequences are immense. In his ignorance of what he was actually about, Hoover didn’t realize that his project, both political and sexual, was as totalitarian as the projects of Stalin and Hitler because stamping out deviance requires total control. So, while it is accurate to label Hoover a racist and a homophobe, his even grander failing was his totalitarianism. He was, in principle, no different than Stalin or Hitler.

 

                  This points to the fact that within Hoover’s politics – and classical liberal politics as well –  is the temptation of totalitarianism. That totalitarianism might be more or less mild, or more or less harsh, but still, it is totalitarianism. Tocqueville called it “soft despotism,” while Aldous Huxley called it the “Brave New World” – and perhaps what Bush called “the New World Order” is related to such totalitarianism.

 

                  And I may add: While Hoover may have helped to defeat communism, to win the Cold War, as Weiner implies, he was incapable, given his most basic political principles, of defeating totalitarianism. In fact, given his most basic political principles, he facilitated totalitarianism. Once the political project is understood as stamping out deviance, the attraction of totalitarianism is almost irresistible, whether deviance be understood as communism, homosexuality, Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, crime, drugs, or poverty. And so, totalitarianism will re-appear again and again in allegedly liberal, democratic orders, disguised as a “Cold War,” a war on terror, a war on crime, on drugs, on poverty, on communism, on covid, etc. The totalitarian temptation, coeval with political life, is embedded in modern, liberal, democratic politics.

 

 

Everybody Who Is Gone Is Here

 

Everybody Who Is Gone Is Here

Peter Schultz

 

                  The above is the title of a book by Jonathan Blitzer on “The United States, Central America, and the Making of a Crisis.” It’s about the crisis that the United States helped create by supporting death squads in places like El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras that led to thousands of Central Americans seeking asylum in the United States.

 

                  It raises some interesting questions, e.g., which was humanizing this crisis, the Reagan administration or the sanctuary movement? The latter arose among volunteers who smuggled asylum seekers, those fearing death in their countries, into the United States and worked to get them legally situated in the US. They were breaking the law and so sought to create sanctuaries, both in churches and cities, where the dislocated would be safe and neither incarcerated nor deported back to their countries where they were likely to be killed.

 

                  Of course, the answer to the question is obvious: It was the sanctuary movement that was attempting to humanize what was a dehumanizing crisis, whereas the US government was helping to create that crisis. But then why do we believe that the government is humanizing when, again and again, it wages war, creating death, destruction, dislocation, and dispossession? Isn’t this quite an illusionary mindset? Why do we privilege governments while criminalizing humanizers?

 

                  The sanctuary movement, which was of course committing crimes, was more humanizing than the US government – and not only when Reagan was president. Which should alert us to the fact that governments don’t humanize; they criminalize and militarize. And, often, they criminalize those trying to humanize.

 

                  Criminalization and militarization are essential to government. Violence and repression are essential characteristics of government and of politics. “Affirming the political” means affirming violence and repression. Political virtue, patriotism, that is, is indistinguishable from affirming violence and repression. “This may be bad morality to conclude with, but I believe it is the truth.”

Politics, Moral Virtue, and Jane Austen

 

Politics, Moral Virtue, and Jane Austen

Peter Schultz

 

                  Let us say, as is commonly thought, that politics points humans in the direction of moral virtue. That is, through politics, humans are encouraged to be good or morally virtuous. For example, being an American is seen as being good or morally virtuous, just as is being Israel or being British and so on.

 

                  There is, in other words, a tendency to equate being political with being good or morally virtuous. Politicians, and especially powerful and popular politicians, are thought to be – despite some evidence to the contrary – good or morally virtuous human beings. And those who refuse to participate politically are thought to be wanting, to be irresponsible, or, in an older sense, “idiotic.”

 

                  But why then does politics so often lead to war and repression? Is it possible that being political, being morally virtuous leads to war and repression? Is there a tendency politically toward war and repression? And is it not so that the more intensely political that humans are, the stronger their tendency toward war and repression, a phenomenon not unheard of and even rather common? Perhaps there is nothing so deadly and dangerous as intensely political or morally virtuous human beings.

 

                  Insofar as this is true, we are presented with a strange situation. It implies that humans would benefit from “learning how to be able not to be good,” as Machiavelli put it in The Prince. Or, put differently, calculated or calibrated violence and repression is preferable to morally infused violence and repression. Using violence and repression in calculated ways is better than using violence and repression in moralistic ways. Politics and morality should be kept separate, a recommendation which is reflected these days by what Americans call “the separation of church and state.”

 

                  But given that politics points toward moral virtue as its goal, keeping them separate is no mean task. It would require a critique of moral virtue, a critique of the political, whereas humans, because we are political animals, are drawn to affirming the political, just as we humans are drawn toward moral virtue. Although they understand virtue differently, all humans want to be virtuous. And there is a tendency to think that were that to happen, our problems would be solved.

 

                  But perhaps it isn’t so. And while this may be “bad morals,” it might just well be the truth, as Jane Austen once wrote [Persuasion]. Was Austen aware of the limitations of moral virtue? That she was might be indicated by her veiled critiques of marriage, the family, British society, and even her heroines and heroes in her novels. Perhaps for Austen, it is the magic of romance, not moral virtue, that accounts for human happiness.

The Perfect War: A Reconsideration

 

The Perfect War: A Reconsideration

Peter Schultz

 

                  I have been reconsidering The Perfect War, a book by William Gibson on the Vietnam War and its meaning.

 

                  A common question posed post-war was: Who lost Vietnam? Now, this question assumes that the war was there to be won, if waged correctly. So, in assessing the war and its loss, people look for mistakes or incompetence of one kind or another, because these explain why what should have happened didn’t happen.

 

                  There is, however, a more general assumption at work here, viz., that politics, done correctly, guarantees success. But what if that is wrong? That is, what if it is politics generally, “the political” even at its best that fails? If it is the political that leads to failure, then even a “perfect war,” that is, a war perfectly waged or conducted, will fail. No one lost the Vietnam War. Although perfectly waged, that war failed. It was doomed to fail, even before it began.

 

                  It is the political that needs to be questioned. The political itself needs to be questioned because it leads to war and repression and neither war nor repression will be successful, or if successful desirable. The greatest political achievements, say, the Roman or British empires, of the abolition of slavery in the United States, were built on war, repression, even terrrorism. Hence, “the political” should not be embraced or “affirmed.” The political and political elites should be contained, stymied, challenged, limited, disrespected, e.g., by someone like Socrates who sought deliberately and actively, i.e., in the marketplace, to subvert the Athenian political order.

 

                  This is the meaning of the expression that “Education is or should be a subversive activity.” One of the most important human activities isn’t being patriotic or being a good citizen. It’s being a good human being, which seems to necessarily involve being subversive.

Savagery: Better Than Sex

 

Savagery: Better Than Sex

Peter Schultz

 

                  Here is a conversation between Walter Cronkite and Dan Rather about President Pappa Bush’s Iraq War, illustrating how much enjoyment American elites can get from savagery.

 

“Walter Cronkite: You have seen the B-52s in operation in Vietnam, I have, and they are almost a terror weapon, they are so powerful. They are dropping all those bombs. My heavens, 14 tons of bombs out of a single airplane – they could very well panic the Iraq army. . .. One thing that’s interesting about this, Dan, these bombs come in a very low rate of speed, comparatively – compared to rocketry and other things and, as a result, the bomb blast is widespread. It can do an awful lot of damage without serious damage to a single target, except right where it lands – blow out a lot of windows, blow out a lot of walls, things of that kind as opposed to high-speed missiles that are inclined to bury themselves and blow up….

“Dan Rather: I want to pick up on what you were talking about with the B-52s. It’s certainly true, anybody who’s seen or been through a B-52 raid, it’s an absolutely unforgettable, mind-searing experience.

“Cronkite: When you’re not underneath it directly.

“Rather: Exactly. And that’s when you’re able to just sort of observe it. It is a devastatingly effective physical bombing weapon, but also psychologically. That’s one of the reasons of going right at the heart of Saddam Hussein’s best troops is [to cause] panic and to – to break morale.”

[Grandin, Kissinger’s Shadow, 208]

 

                  Cronkite and Rather are getting off here on B-52s and their savagery. There was a book published when I was much younger, The Joy of Sex, which was controversial for a little while. Well, it seems to me Cronkite and Rather could collaborate on a book entitled, The Joy of Savagery.

 

And if you think they’re the only ones who got off on savagery, recall Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s response to Leslie Stahl’s question about the 500,000 Iraqi children who died because of the effects of President Clinton’s sanctions. As Stahl pointed out, “I mean that’s more children than died in Hiroshima.” Albright: “We think the price is worth it.” Oh, the joy of savagery. [Kissinger’s Shadow, 209-210]

 

Keep these deaths, keep US savagery in mind this Memorial Day.

Drug War Capitalism, Drug War Politics

 

Drug War Capitalism, Drug War Politics

Peter Schultz

 

                  From the book by Dawn Paley, Drug War Capitalism. Quoting Canadian sociologist, Jasmin Hristov:

 

                  “The efforts of the elite to eliminate any challenges to the status quo have found expression in various politicoeconomic models throughout history. The features common to all of them have been the highly unequal socioeconomic structure consisting of armed force, repressive laws, and anti-subversive ideology, packaged under different names – the War on Communism, the War on Drugs, the War on Terror.” [32-33]

 

                  The war on drugs in Mexico, for example, isn’t actually about drugs. But by means of that war “The US has been able to, through drug trafficking, and the excuse of trying to control narcotrafico, [pour] hundreds of millions, now billions of dollars into Mexican security, and Mexican armed forces, and it is changing the whole nature of Mexican society. Mexican society is becoming militarized. And, again, it’s being done in the name of combating drug trafficking but … part of the face of this global capitalism increasingly [serves] the function of social control when the inequalities and misery become just so intense that there’s no other way but through military and coercive controls to maintain social control.” [33-34]

 

                  The “war on drugs” disguises a vast program of social and political control so when the misery index becomes unbearable, social and political control can be maintained via militarization and capitalism. In other words “the war on drugs” needs to be contextualized in terms of the “US [and its] transnational interests,” including “the territorial and social expansion of capitalism.” [30]

Virtue: It's the Question

 

Virtue: It’s the Question

Peter Schultz

 

                  It seems to be universally agreed that virtue is the answer. That is, all human groups or factions, whether they be capitalists, communists, socialists, Catholics, protestants, liberals or conservatives, oligarchs or democrats, agree that virtue is the answer; that is, it is the key to political and social health and decency.

 

                  But it seems rather that virtue should be the question, not the answer.

 

                  To wit: William Colby, in his maiden speech as the CIA’s DCI, called for agents “to show moral and intellectual courage.” But, because the CIA kills and tortures, it is fair to ask: Do “moral and intellectual courage” include murder and torture, ala’ the Phoenix program that Colby oversaw in Vietnam? Has the CIA transformed murder and torture into moral and intellectual courage? Does the political transform killing and torture, “going to the dark side,” into moral and intellectual courage, as suggested by Vice President Dick Cheney? And, if so, what does this say about the political and about those who are called “political elites,” who are commonly praised as superior human beings serving as human benefactors? Are they distinguished by their virtues?

 

                  William Colby referred to the CIA as part of “the intelligence profession.” In his mind, the CIA is “a profession,” like, apparently, the medical profession. But with one, small difference: CIA professionals, unlike medical professionals, don’t take an oath “to do no harm.” In fact, doing harm represents the profession’s virtue, and its guarantee of respectability. Demonstrating and achieving a virtuous respectability wears a strange countenance, it would seem, one that looks a lot like viciousness. So it goes, politically.

Michael Hastings and Myths

 

Michael Hastings and Myths

Peter Schultz

 

                  Michael Hastings in his book The Operators points out that he was criticized because he refused to play along with the myth that Generals McCrystal and Petraeus were potentially saviors of the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hastings subverted these myths by exposing the generals’ limitations, which eventually became visible in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

                  But there is another myth, viz., that there are political saviors. There are no such saviors, not because of the limitations of the likes of McCrystal and Petraeus, but because political salvation is an illusion. Political life does not allow for or admit of salvation. At its best, political life allows for ruling and being ruled in turn – that is, it allows for shared rule or rule based on consent. Obviously, such rule would be based on compromise and negotiation, i.e., on constant compromising and negotiating as those ruling and those being ruled would need to work out their differences.

 

                  Some questions and considerations: What role would philosophy or philosophers play in this best political arrangement? Or: what role would monarchy play in it? To what extent is monarchy consistent with shared rule? To what extent is slavery consistent with shared rule?

 

                  Which characteristic personality type, the thumotic or the erotic, is more consistent with, more compatible with shared rule? Take note of the prevalence of “more or less questions” when thinking about politics, about political life, revealing that compromises and negotiations characterize political life at its best, not impositions. In fact, not even impositions by allegedly superior human beings are best. There may be such human beings, but their rule is or should be suspect. And, perhaps, these superior human beings would recognize this themselves and act – or not act – accordingly.

Politics

 

Politics

Peter Schultz

 

                  What does it tell you about politics that people like Generals McCrystal and Petraeus fare so well? Are treated as if they were godlike?

 

                  What does it tell you about politics that wars are so common? Or that war “heroes” thrive politically? Or that assassinations are often honored? Or that assassins are often honored?

 

                  We avoid these questions because they make us uncomfortable. They are too troubling because they shake our faith in, our belief in the political. We prefer to go on believing in, affirming the political as the source of human betterment rather than the source of human corruption. And, yet, the very best political orders have been characterized by, riven with corruption. “War is the health of the state.” But it isn’t the health of human beings.

 

                  Michael Hastings got close to raising these questions – in fact, he got too close to raising them, as did Socrates and Aristotle. Don’t make the mistake of failing to see that political health is built on death and destruction (e.g., a treasonous war in 1776).

 

                  Perhaps Nixon came to see that political health in the United States required his “destruction,” which is when he resigned. Perhaps JFK came to see the same thing. Certainly, Lincoln did.