The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam IV

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam IV

Peter Schultz

 

                  Dean Rusk, trying to refute arguments that JFK had decided to pull the US and its military out of Vietnam, said that no president could “leave Americans in uniform in a combat situation for domestic political purposes.” [324] Rusk was wrong, both about JFK and about presidents generally. Not only presidents but even generals like General Harkins, et. al., left American soldiers in combat situations for political purposes, e.g., for fortifying the Army hierarchy devoted to the Concept. This is the meaning of Clausewitz’s famous remark that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.”

 

                  JFK was conspiring to pull the US out of Vietnam after the 1964 presidential election, should he have won. As Newman points out, “Kennedy kept his plan a closely guarded secret,” sharing it only with a few of those he trusted and not with others like General Taylor, Dean Rusk, or his vice president, LBJ. It, the plan, had to be kept secret because had it become known “’before the 1964 election, there would be a conservative outcry against returning him to the Presidency for a second term.’” [322] As JFK told Kenny O’Donnell, “’If I tried to pull out completely now from Vietnam, we would have another Joe McCarthy scare…, but I can do it after I’m re-elected.’” [323] As Newman argued, “Kennedy knew the war was a lost cause, and that his problem was how to disguise his intentions until after the election.”  [323]

 

                  So, again, it appears that “conspiracies are the normal continuation of normal politics by normal means.” General Harkins, et. al., including the Vice President, were conspiring to keep the US and its military in Vietnam, and even at elevated levels. While JFK, et. al., were conspiring to get the US and its military out of Vietnam. And others were conspiring to make sure that Kennedy did not succeed, either in getting re-elected or in getting the US out of Vietnam. His assassination, conveniently, ensured both of those outcomes.

 

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam III

  

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam, III

Peter Schultz

 

                  Again, from Newman’s book, JFK and Vietnam:

 

                  “McNamara did not question Harkins’ view that the war was being won, but did question the suggestion that it could be over in one year. Harkins’ claim seems to incredibly naïve that one may ask with justification: how could the American commander be so out of touch with reality? If Harkins knew that the order of battle carried well under half of the actual communist forces; if he knew – as he later admitted but would not let Jimmy Harris report outside MACV – that the infiltration problem was serious and getting worse; if he knew the casualty figures were 30 percent too high for the Viet Cong and 30 percent too low for the government; if he knew that the SDC were defecting as fast the government was trying to replace them – how could he possibly think that victory could be achieved in just twelve months? We do not know what motivated Harkins, but whatever it was, it surely defies a sound military explanation.” [288]

 

                  What motivated Harkins was nothing less than protecting the Army hierarchy, its conventional wisdom about fighting wars, and protecting his role in that hierarchy. If that hierarchy was seen as failing, then Harkins and his colleagues would also be seen as failing. So, Harkins conspired to protect his power and the power of a hierarchy he believed in, a hierarchy that was being challenged, that was threatened by subversive individuals who were not aware of the consequences of their actions. Perhaps McNamara did not question or challenge Harkins more closely because he too believed in the Concept, because he too believed in the established Army hierarchy and, so, wanted to protect it and Harkins, et. al.

 

                  It is important to emphasize, however, that despite Newman’s apparent surprise at Harkins behavior, Harkins was merely acting as all political actors behave when their power and their hierarchy are threatened. Which is why Oglesby’s take on conspiracies rings true: “Conspiracies are the normal continuation of normal politics in a normal way.” The allure of politics is power and, so, when one’s power is threatened, those involved do what they think they must do to preserve their power. Normally this means acting conspiratorially.

 

 

 

 

 

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam, II

  

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam, II

Peter Schultz

 

                  Again, from the book, JFK and Vietnam, by John M. Newman, about how the upper reaches of those in charge of the war in Vietnam conspired to defeat those who knew that the war was not going well at all, and certainly not as well as those like General Harkins wanted McNamara and Kennedy to believe.

 

                  According to the historian Andrew Krepinevich, “the efforts of Allen and Benedict to tell the truth about” the war’s “progress” was ignored by the Army Staff: “The negative reports given Rossen by advisors in the field were symptoms of an emerging revolt by Army advisors against the Army hierarchy’s view of how well the war was going and how well suited the methods of the Concept were against the insurgents.” [282, emphasis added]

 

                  Newman continues: “By ‘Concept,’ Krepinevich means the World War II conventional approach to war. The advisors’ arguments were ‘doomed to failure,’ … because this unwelcome message challenged the very foundations upon which the Army had constructed its approach to the war.” [282]

 

                  And, of course, this “emerging revolt” challenged the power of the Army hierarchy, represented by the likes of General Harkin, which was defined by their embrace of the Concept. Insofar as the Concept was deemed a failure, then so too would that hierarchy be deemed failures. And, so, that hierarchy was conspiring in order to maintain its power, its rule. Hierarchies, especially embedded hierarchies, conspire in order to maintain their power, even to the extent of conspiring against or conspiring with presidents and secretaries of defense. The Army hierarchy, infested with CIA agents, that conspired against JFK also conspired with LBJ in order to fight in Vietnam according to the Concept, that is, according to what was taken to be the best “conventional approach to war” by those best suited to employ it. As LBJ allegedly put it to the Chiefs: “Get me elected and then you can have your war.” That is, they could have their war in Vietnam as well as how they wanted to fight it.

 

                  And it bears pointing out that the advisors, in their “emerging revolt,” would also have to behave conspiratorially if they were to succeed. “Conspiracy is the normal continuation of normal politics by normal means.” So it goes.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam

  

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam

Peter Schultz

 

                  The following passages are from the book JFK and Vietnam, by John M. Newman.

 

                  “The May 1962 SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] conference, then, was a watershed event in more ways than one. Above all else, however, it is a monument to the first arbitrary reduction of the Viet Cong order of battle – and it would not be the last. Benedict reports a great deal of frustration among those who had worked so hard to develop the intelligence, which was then corrupted and delivered to McNamara in this conference. Captain Blascak recalls: ‘This is when the big lie started.’” Or when the Vietnam conspiracy unfolded.  

 

                  “The Secretary of Defense was purposely misled on nearly all of the crucial aspects of the war: the size of the enemy; the number and quality of enemy operations versus the number and quality of friendly operations; the territory controlled by the enemy versus the territory controlled by friendly forces…. The maps, statistics, and briefing he was given led him to remark at a press conference after the meeting that ‘every quantitative measurement … shows that we are winning the war.’ He was quoted in the New York Times as saying he was ‘tremendously encouraged’ by the military developments in South Vietnam.” This conspiracy not only had the approval of General Harkins, he was leading it.

 

                  “In a rare comment made in response to questions posed by the author, McNamara stated: ‘1. I did not know; 2. did not suspect; have no indication now that I was deceived.’”

 

                  Obviously, as amazing as it sounds, Robert S. McNamara, the leader of “the best and the brightest” of the Kennedy administration, did not understand the political and the role conspiracy plays in normal politics. Apparently, even after the fact, McNamara could not comprehend how the US military in Vietnam conspired against the president of the United States in order make war there.

 

The Political and Conspiracies

  

The Political and Conspiracies

Peter Schultz

 

                  James Hougan [Secret Agenda] asks why didn’t John Mitchell “simply defenestrate … Liddy” when he offered his original plan for surveillance during the 1972 presidential election. Answer: Because he didn’t understand the political. He didn’t understand that “conspiracy is the normal continuation of normal politics by normal means….” [Oglesby, The Yankee and Cowboy Wars]

 

                  Political actors are invariably conspirators, thereby making politics “conflict-wracked and dialectical,” not “serene and hierarchical.” [Oglesby, ibid] Mitchell didn’t see Liddy as dangerous because he didn’t appreciate that Liddy was conspiring for his own purposes, his own advancement and achievement, for the sake of his own power, and not just for Nixon’s re-election.

 

                  The crucial thing to remember is that the allure of politics is POWER. Political power is seductive, and it leads, invariably, to conspiracies. Conspiracies are the political norm, the default position of politics.

 

                  To understand what this means, care must be taken when reading Oglesby, who was writing in the context of JFK’s assassination, which was, obviously, a most significant event and conspiracy, a really BIG conspiracy. But as L. Fletcher Prouty points out, most conspiracies are small, insignificant – at least at first. Which is one reason that they work. If you focus on Nixon’s conspiratorial behavior during Watergate, you will overlook Dean’s, Haig’s, McCord’s, Hunt’s, Woodward’s and Bernstein’s, Admiral Moorer’s, and Ellsberg’s conspiratorial behavior. They all behaved conspiratorially.

 

                  Failure to appreciate the conspiratorial character of politics helps explain passivity like Mitchell’s vis-à-vis Liddy. It helps explain the passivity, inactivity evident in the lead up to 9/11. The thought that politics is “serene and hierarchical” is misleading, even delusional. Moreover, grand conspiratorial theories, those Oglesby calls “the omnipotent-cabal” conspiracies, tend to reinforce the view that politics is serene and hierarchical. Conversely, as Oglesby notices “every faction … conspires against each and each against all,” leading to repeated failures.

 

                  It would seem that the conventional wisdom about politics is that being hierarchical makes politics serene. Certainly, those in positions of power tend to see hierarchical politics as essentially serene. Oglesby himself implies as much by linking serenity with hierarchy and contrasting it with conflict and dialectic. But what if the situation is the opposite, viz., that hierarchy doesn’t create serenity but the opposite as humans struggle for power? The allure of power, which the essence of the political, makes any and every political hierarchy conflict-wracked and dialectical. There are those with power and those who want it. And because every regime is hierarchical, to one degree or another, every regime is conflict-wracked as the struggle for power goes on between those with power and those who want it. As illustrated by the consequences of Mitchell’s treatment of Liddy, this is something that those embedded in the upper reaches of a hierarchy cannot afford to ignore, even regarding aides and supporters. Conspiracies and conspirators pervade the political arena and they constitute “normal politics by normal means.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

All the Presidents' Follies

  

All the Presidents’ Follies

Peter Schultz

 

                  Peter Bergen has published an excellent book, All the Presidents’ Wars, which does a wonderful job of exposing the inanity of the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden presidencies as they waged war in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as throughout the world. And it requires very little reading to understand how inane these presidents and their war-making was.

 

                  “If the key tenet of counterinsurgency was ‘protecting the population,’ bombing them was clearly not the right approach.” [p. 172] Bombing human beings, anywhere, will undermine any attempt to “win hearts and minds,” or even some basic acceptance and loyalty.

                 

And yet, when General Petraeus replaced General McChrystal, after the latter had dissed Obama and his administration, “Petraeus reversed McChrystal’s ‘courageous restraint’ directive to try to avoid civilian casualties; as a result, US airstrikes in Afghanistan increased. Petraeus was supported in this by CENTCOM commander General Jim Mattis, who thought the policy of restraint was hobbling American troops … and losing their confidence in the process.” [p. 175]

 

Populations that are being decimated by bombs are not being protected. And it would appear that what was required to keep American troops “confident,” viz., attacking without concern for civilian casualties, was precisely what would lead to US defeat in Afghanistan. The number of troops in Afghanistan is meaningless in this regard. So, the US was faced with a choice: to bomb or not to bomb. But it was a meaningless choice: If the US didn’t bomb, it would lose, but if the US bombed unrestrainedly, it would also lose.

 

As Bergen notes: “There was a certain irony here: Mattis and Petraeus had both overseen the counterinsurgency manual that advocated avoiding civilian casualties that might help fuel the insurgency, while McChrystal was the ‘direct action’ general who had vastly increased the number of raids by US special forces.” [p. 175]

 

Certainly, the irony was there, and elsewhere as well. But so too was inanity, an inanity that pervaded American political and military elites. Perhaps such inanity is inseparable from imperialism.

Watergate Reconsidered

  

Watergate Reconsidered

Peter Schultz

 

                  From Jim Hougan’s contemplation of the Watergate scandal, he concluded that “The case was to be treated as a moral fable: an open-and-shut case of political espionage carried out by the bad guys in the White House against the good guys in the Democratic party.” [206] Or, in a slightly different version, Watergate was considered a case of political espionage that threatened the democratic processes of the U.S., with the bad guys seeking to undermine democracy by undermining the integrity of the upcoming 1972 elections.

 

                  Now, in treating Watergate as a moral fable, other possibilities involving political espionage disappeared. These other possibilities, e.g., that “the break in had been sabotaged,” were treated as “almost subversive.” [205-206] Treating the possibility of sabotage as subversive meant questions as to the saboteurs and their agenda were not raised. Accepting that political espionage is dangerous because it is used to undermine the integrity of democratic processes like elections, it is dangerous not to consider it in all of its forms, not just in its partisan form. Suppose, e.g., that the military were to engage in political espionage, leading toward fears of a “Seven Days in May” scenario. Or suppose that the CIA were to engage in political espionage, not for partisan purposes but in order to control American politics and point it in the direction of “regime changes” in other nations or in the direction of other covert actions, e.g., assassinations.

 

                  So, by treating Watergate as a partisan moral fable, and one in which the allegedly good guys won, the moral fable obscured what was actually going on. And that what was going on was not good guys versus bad guys but a power struggle or power struggles among competing institutions such as the executive, the presidency, the legislative, the judiciary, the mainstream media, “intelligence” agencies, and the military. The partisan moral fable tells us nothing about these struggles or about their resolutions. And that means we are blind to the significance of the Watergate scandal and its resolution for our political order. That Nixon was forced to resign tells us nothing about the scandal’s effect on the presidency and on presidential politics in relation to other powerful governmental institutions like the CIA or the military.

 

                  And it seems fairly clear that the military emerged from the scandal fortified, while the presidency was weakened. General Alexander Haig assumed significant, perhaps even dominant power in the White House, so much so that a plausible case was made about Haig’s Coup. And although the CIA’s fingerprints and personnel were all over the burglaries, and although Dick Helms was tried and convicted of perjury, those fingerprints and the personnel involved pretty much disappeared from the conventional, commonly accepted accounts of Watergate. This despite the fact that James McCord, a CIA operative, perhaps retired, played a huge role in making it possible for Judge Sirica to expose the connections between the burglaries and the White House. Moreover, people with CIA connections were involved in installing and then revealing the taping system Nixon had installed in the White House. Even when, post-scandal, the CIA was investigated and “the family jewels” revealed, the CIA was not considered a subversive agency, while Nixon, et. al., were. The CIA was flawed but not subversive, whereas Nixon, et. al., were flawed and subversive.

 

                  Making the scandal “a morality play … [n]ecesarily … entailed a simple story with the President at its center. Close scrutiny of the burglars (and of the burglaries themselves) was … avoided because such scrutiny raised questions about their loyalty to President Nixon.” Also avoided was any concern with the power conflicts among different governmental institutions, such as the military, the “intelligence community,” the judiciary, and the mainstream media, promoting political agendas at odds with the President’s agendas. And, so, Watergate became a simple and simplistic moral fable and remains so today.