The Normality of Conspiracy

  

The Normality of Conspiracy

Peter Schultz

 

                  The following is from the book, Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby.

 

                  “Frustration drove Bill Colby after the Diem assassination…. Top of Colby’s list would be revamping the CIA’s Saigon station. Ambassador Lodge had effectively sabotaged John Richardson, and McCone had been prevented from sending out Colby in his stead, but the Far East Division chief became determined to have his man, not Lodge’s. It was a strike against acting chief of station Dave Smith that Lodge liked him, and Smith’s chances were not helped by his authorship of the cable advising Langley not to dismiss assassination, an analysis Colby considered to have undercut his efforts in Washington. Smith’s days in Saigon were numbered.” [132]

 

                  So, Colby was playing the part of conspirator, as were his political enemies, Ambassador Lodge, for example. “He, McCone, and the CIA might have lost the policy battle in Washington, but Colby was determined to effect change directly, on the ground in Vietnam. This became the quiet subtext of his post-coup swing through Southeast Asia.” [ibid] So, this “swing” was part of Colby’s conspiracy to change things “on the ground in Vietnam.” Colby, the conspirator, was committed to controlling US policies in Vietnam and, so, “That trip turned into the point of departure for new CIA initiatives, greatly increasing the agency’s role in the Vietnam war, as well as Southeast Asia more broadly…. In a way he seemed to submerge his loss of friends in the Ngo family with frantic activity that might avenge them by winning the Vietnam war.” [ibid]

 

                  Colby was playing the part of political conspirator, seeking to impose the policies he thought appropriate, and he seemed to think of this as normal politics. It wasn’t a “quagmire” in Vietnam that led the US into a major ground war in Asia; it was the “quagmire” of the American political order that led the US into that major war in Asia. Or it can be said that the secret wars of William Colby, et. al., led the US into a major ground war in Asia. The “quagmire” responsible for the fiasco of the Vietnam war wasn’t in Vietnam; it was in the United States, and it was created by conspirators like William Colby.

 

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam IV

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam IV

Peter Schultz

 

                  Dean Rusk, trying to refute arguments that JFK had decided to pull the US and its military out of Vietnam, said that no president could “leave Americans in uniform in a combat situation for domestic political purposes.” [324] Rusk was wrong, both about JFK and about presidents generally. Not only presidents but even generals like General Harkins, et. al., left American soldiers in combat situations for political purposes, e.g., for fortifying the Army hierarchy devoted to the Concept. This is the meaning of Clausewitz’s famous remark that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.”

 

                  JFK was conspiring to pull the US out of Vietnam after the 1964 presidential election, should he have won. As Newman points out, “Kennedy kept his plan a closely guarded secret,” sharing it only with a few of those he trusted and not with others like General Taylor, Dean Rusk, or his vice president, LBJ. It, the plan, had to be kept secret because had it become known “’before the 1964 election, there would be a conservative outcry against returning him to the Presidency for a second term.’” [322] As JFK told Kenny O’Donnell, “’If I tried to pull out completely now from Vietnam, we would have another Joe McCarthy scare…, but I can do it after I’m re-elected.’” [323] As Newman argued, “Kennedy knew the war was a lost cause, and that his problem was how to disguise his intentions until after the election.”  [323]

 

                  So, again, it appears that “conspiracies are the normal continuation of normal politics by normal means.” General Harkins, et. al., including the Vice President, were conspiring to keep the US and its military in Vietnam, and even at elevated levels. While JFK, et. al., were conspiring to get the US and its military out of Vietnam. And others were conspiring to make sure that Kennedy did not succeed, either in getting re-elected or in getting the US out of Vietnam. His assassination, conveniently, ensured both of those outcomes.

 

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam III

  

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam, III

Peter Schultz

 

                  Again, from Newman’s book, JFK and Vietnam:

 

                  “McNamara did not question Harkins’ view that the war was being won, but did question the suggestion that it could be over in one year. Harkins’ claim seems to incredibly naïve that one may ask with justification: how could the American commander be so out of touch with reality? If Harkins knew that the order of battle carried well under half of the actual communist forces; if he knew – as he later admitted but would not let Jimmy Harris report outside MACV – that the infiltration problem was serious and getting worse; if he knew the casualty figures were 30 percent too high for the Viet Cong and 30 percent too low for the government; if he knew that the SDC were defecting as fast the government was trying to replace them – how could he possibly think that victory could be achieved in just twelve months? We do not know what motivated Harkins, but whatever it was, it surely defies a sound military explanation.” [288]

 

                  What motivated Harkins was nothing less than protecting the Army hierarchy, its conventional wisdom about fighting wars, and protecting his role in that hierarchy. If that hierarchy was seen as failing, then Harkins and his colleagues would also be seen as failing. So, Harkins conspired to protect his power and the power of a hierarchy he believed in, a hierarchy that was being challenged, that was threatened by subversive individuals who were not aware of the consequences of their actions. Perhaps McNamara did not question or challenge Harkins more closely because he too believed in the Concept, because he too believed in the established Army hierarchy and, so, wanted to protect it and Harkins, et. al.

 

                  It is important to emphasize, however, that despite Newman’s apparent surprise at Harkins behavior, Harkins was merely acting as all political actors behave when their power and their hierarchy are threatened. Which is why Oglesby’s take on conspiracies rings true: “Conspiracies are the normal continuation of normal politics in a normal way.” The allure of politics is power and, so, when one’s power is threatened, those involved do what they think they must do to preserve their power. Normally this means acting conspiratorially.

 

 

 

 

 

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam, II

  

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam, II

Peter Schultz

 

                  Again, from the book, JFK and Vietnam, by John M. Newman, about how the upper reaches of those in charge of the war in Vietnam conspired to defeat those who knew that the war was not going well at all, and certainly not as well as those like General Harkins wanted McNamara and Kennedy to believe.

 

                  According to the historian Andrew Krepinevich, “the efforts of Allen and Benedict to tell the truth about” the war’s “progress” was ignored by the Army Staff: “The negative reports given Rossen by advisors in the field were symptoms of an emerging revolt by Army advisors against the Army hierarchy’s view of how well the war was going and how well suited the methods of the Concept were against the insurgents.” [282, emphasis added]

 

                  Newman continues: “By ‘Concept,’ Krepinevich means the World War II conventional approach to war. The advisors’ arguments were ‘doomed to failure,’ … because this unwelcome message challenged the very foundations upon which the Army had constructed its approach to the war.” [282]

 

                  And, of course, this “emerging revolt” challenged the power of the Army hierarchy, represented by the likes of General Harkin, which was defined by their embrace of the Concept. Insofar as the Concept was deemed a failure, then so too would that hierarchy be deemed failures. And, so, that hierarchy was conspiring in order to maintain its power, its rule. Hierarchies, especially embedded hierarchies, conspire in order to maintain their power, even to the extent of conspiring against or conspiring with presidents and secretaries of defense. The Army hierarchy, infested with CIA agents, that conspired against JFK also conspired with LBJ in order to fight in Vietnam according to the Concept, that is, according to what was taken to be the best “conventional approach to war” by those best suited to employ it. As LBJ allegedly put it to the Chiefs: “Get me elected and then you can have your war.” That is, they could have their war in Vietnam as well as how they wanted to fight it.

 

                  And it bears pointing out that the advisors, in their “emerging revolt,” would also have to behave conspiratorially if they were to succeed. “Conspiracy is the normal continuation of normal politics by normal means.” So it goes.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam

  

The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam

Peter Schultz

 

                  The following passages are from the book JFK and Vietnam, by John M. Newman.

 

                  “The May 1962 SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] conference, then, was a watershed event in more ways than one. Above all else, however, it is a monument to the first arbitrary reduction of the Viet Cong order of battle – and it would not be the last. Benedict reports a great deal of frustration among those who had worked so hard to develop the intelligence, which was then corrupted and delivered to McNamara in this conference. Captain Blascak recalls: ‘This is when the big lie started.’” Or when the Vietnam conspiracy unfolded.  

 

                  “The Secretary of Defense was purposely misled on nearly all of the crucial aspects of the war: the size of the enemy; the number and quality of enemy operations versus the number and quality of friendly operations; the territory controlled by the enemy versus the territory controlled by friendly forces…. The maps, statistics, and briefing he was given led him to remark at a press conference after the meeting that ‘every quantitative measurement … shows that we are winning the war.’ He was quoted in the New York Times as saying he was ‘tremendously encouraged’ by the military developments in South Vietnam.” This conspiracy not only had the approval of General Harkins, he was leading it.

 

                  “In a rare comment made in response to questions posed by the author, McNamara stated: ‘1. I did not know; 2. did not suspect; have no indication now that I was deceived.’”

 

                  Obviously, as amazing as it sounds, Robert S. McNamara, the leader of “the best and the brightest” of the Kennedy administration, did not understand the political and the role conspiracy plays in normal politics. Apparently, even after the fact, McNamara could not comprehend how the US military in Vietnam conspired against the president of the United States in order make war there.

 

The Political and Conspiracies

  

The Political and Conspiracies

Peter Schultz

 

                  James Hougan [Secret Agenda] asks why didn’t John Mitchell “simply defenestrate … Liddy” when he offered his original plan for surveillance during the 1972 presidential election. Answer: Because he didn’t understand the political. He didn’t understand that “conspiracy is the normal continuation of normal politics by normal means….” [Oglesby, The Yankee and Cowboy Wars]

 

                  Political actors are invariably conspirators, thereby making politics “conflict-wracked and dialectical,” not “serene and hierarchical.” [Oglesby, ibid] Mitchell didn’t see Liddy as dangerous because he didn’t appreciate that Liddy was conspiring for his own purposes, his own advancement and achievement, for the sake of his own power, and not just for Nixon’s re-election.

 

                  The crucial thing to remember is that the allure of politics is POWER. Political power is seductive, and it leads, invariably, to conspiracies. Conspiracies are the political norm, the default position of politics.

 

                  To understand what this means, care must be taken when reading Oglesby, who was writing in the context of JFK’s assassination, which was, obviously, a most significant event and conspiracy, a really BIG conspiracy. But as L. Fletcher Prouty points out, most conspiracies are small, insignificant – at least at first. Which is one reason that they work. If you focus on Nixon’s conspiratorial behavior during Watergate, you will overlook Dean’s, Haig’s, McCord’s, Hunt’s, Woodward’s and Bernstein’s, Admiral Moorer’s, and Ellsberg’s conspiratorial behavior. They all behaved conspiratorially.

 

                  Failure to appreciate the conspiratorial character of politics helps explain passivity like Mitchell’s vis-à-vis Liddy. It helps explain the passivity, inactivity evident in the lead up to 9/11. The thought that politics is “serene and hierarchical” is misleading, even delusional. Moreover, grand conspiratorial theories, those Oglesby calls “the omnipotent-cabal” conspiracies, tend to reinforce the view that politics is serene and hierarchical. Conversely, as Oglesby notices “every faction … conspires against each and each against all,” leading to repeated failures.

 

                  It would seem that the conventional wisdom about politics is that being hierarchical makes politics serene. Certainly, those in positions of power tend to see hierarchical politics as essentially serene. Oglesby himself implies as much by linking serenity with hierarchy and contrasting it with conflict and dialectic. But what if the situation is the opposite, viz., that hierarchy doesn’t create serenity but the opposite as humans struggle for power? The allure of power, which the essence of the political, makes any and every political hierarchy conflict-wracked and dialectical. There are those with power and those who want it. And because every regime is hierarchical, to one degree or another, every regime is conflict-wracked as the struggle for power goes on between those with power and those who want it. As illustrated by the consequences of Mitchell’s treatment of Liddy, this is something that those embedded in the upper reaches of a hierarchy cannot afford to ignore, even regarding aides and supporters. Conspiracies and conspirators pervade the political arena and they constitute “normal politics by normal means.”