The Normal Conspiratorial Politics of Vietnam
Peter Schultz
The following passages are from the book JFK and Vietnam, by John M. Newman.
“The May 1962 SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] conference, then, was a watershed event in more ways than one. Above all else, however, it is a monument to the first arbitrary reduction of the Viet Cong order of battle – and it would not be the last. Benedict reports a great deal of frustration among those who had worked so hard to develop the intelligence, which was then corrupted and delivered to McNamara in this conference. Captain Blascak recalls: ‘This is when the big lie started.’” Or when the Vietnam conspiracy unfolded.
“The Secretary of Defense was purposely misled on nearly all of the crucial aspects of the war: the size of the enemy; the number and quality of enemy operations versus the number and quality of friendly operations; the territory controlled by the enemy versus the territory controlled by friendly forces…. The maps, statistics, and briefing he was given led him to remark at a press conference after the meeting that ‘every quantitative measurement … shows that we are winning the war.’ He was quoted in the New York Times as saying he was ‘tremendously encouraged’ by the military developments in South Vietnam.” This conspiracy not only had the approval of General Harkins, he was leading it.
“In a rare comment made in response to questions posed by the author, McNamara stated: ‘1. I did not know; 2. did not suspect; have no indication now that I was deceived.’”
Obviously, as amazing as it sounds, Robert S. McNamara, the leader of “the best and the brightest” of the Kennedy administration, did not understand the political and the role conspiracy plays in normal politics. Apparently, even after the fact, McNamara could not comprehend how the US military in Vietnam conspired against the president of the United States in order make war there.
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