Ellsberg v. Oliver Stone

  

Ellsberg v. Oliver Stone

Peter Schultz

 

                  There is a fundamental misperception regarding the Vietnam war: That the U.S. and Hanoi, et. al., wanted the war to end and were working to end the war during 1968.

 

                  Daniel Ellsberg, in his memoir, Secrets, forces us to wonder if that was the case. As Ellsberg makes clear, LBJ’s decision not to seek re-election in 1968, which he, LBJ, presented as part of his attempt to end the war, was not intended to do that. In fact, it was LBJ’s way of preserving the power of the established elites, the “cold warriors,” which would allow for continuing the war.

 

                  Hubert Humphrey, as well, could not afford to publicly seek the war’s end because “if he did declare some independence [from Johnson], ever so slightly, he faced … forms of retribution from an enraged president.” And this enragement from Johnson gives away his commitment to the war.

 

                  Hanoi, as Ellsberg points out “wasn’t acting as if it [wanted]… to get our bombing stopped or to end the war by making concessions…. Neither party was ready to make any significant concessions…. [222]

 

                  And Nixon wanted the war continued because that would help ensure his election to the presidency, which is why he worked covertly to get Thieu to reject any negotiations to end the war. And, of course, continuing the war was the key, Nixon knew, to his re-election in 1972.

 

                  So, when Oliver Stone, in his movie “Nixon,” melodramatically uses an alleged confrontation between Nixon and a young, female protester at the Lincoln Memorial to illustrate the power of “the system” – which produced a war that allegedly no one wanted – his melodrama misleads. Powerful human beings in Washington, Hanoi, and Saigon, for various reasons, wanted and saw to it that the war would go on.

 

                  So, even when “They did get into direct, formal talks, … that was what had happened: nothing. The war went on…. Thus, by itself, ‘stopping the bombing’ of the North altogether, unconditionally, permanently, was … a false issue, almost a distraction, when it came to ending the war.” [222, emphasis added]

 

                  When it came to ending the war, it did not end because the most powerful human beings did not want it to end. It was not that “the system” rendered these powerful human beings powerless. It was that these powerful human beings used their power to make war. They chose to make war, to continue to make war. So, if the war was “a quagmire,” it was a quagmire constructed, deliberately, by powerful human beings, who then used the “quagmire story” to disguise their embrace of an obscenely violent war.

 

                  And as a result of Johnson’s decision not to run in 1968 and because “we had two major candidates going around the country not talking about ending the bombing,” the war went on and even “more or less disappeared from the mainstream of American political debate as a major issue … [from] March 31,1968 to Nixon’s invasion of Cambodia on April 30, 1970.” [226] As Ellsberg points out: “The lack of public controversy … reflected a tenacious belief … that Johnson’s March 31 announcement … constituted a conscious and decisive turning point toward the prompt ending of American involvement in the war in Indochina.” [226] The lack of public controversy regarding the war was precisely what the established elites in Washington wanted because that allowed them to continue the war without threatening their power and authority by empowering antiwar activists and other left wingers. This conspiracy would be so successful in the long run that Richard Nixon would be rewarded with a historical landslide victory in the 1972 presidential election, a victory that buried the legitimacy of any left-wing political alternatives. Ultimately, that burial may be said to have made possible the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. So it goes.