CIA Operations and US Security

  

CIA Operations and US Security

Peter Schultz

 

                  How a CIA operation compromised US security by undermining attempts to prevent attacks on the US homeland.

 

                  The CIA, specifically Alec Station, was running an operation against at least two suspected terrorists, Almihdhar and Alhazmi. It was a surveillance operation that led to Kuala Lumpur and a meeting of suspected terrorists in January 2000. Questions were raised later about whether the Agency had notified the FBI of this meeting, with the CIA saying it had done so and the FBI contending it was not notified.

 

                  It is crucial to understand CIA’s “operations,” what they are and what they aren’t to understand what happened. Alec Station said regarding its operation that “we need to continue the effort to identify these travelers and their activities … to determine if there is any true threat posed.” [Bamford, 223]

 

                  Note needs be taken of the goals of this op: to identify travelers and identify “any true threat posed” and, of course, to achieve these goals secretly. The secrecy is why no thought was ever given to disrupting the travels and activities of these suspects. Besides, that was not “the op,” not the job, which was to identify and understand certain things. And this would explain why the CIA would not have notified the FBI, because that would violate and might compromise the secrecy required by the operation. As an FBI agent pointed out: “They didn’t want the bureau meddling in their business [i.e., their operation] – that’s why they didn’t tell the FBI.”

 

                  It needs be emphasized that “the op.” is the thing, the CIA’s thing, the thing to be protected, held close as is said, so it could be successful. The CIA’s goal was a successful operation, which required preserving the secrecy of the operation in every way possible. Sharing intelligence with the FBI could compromise that secrecy, so it was not to be done. Disrupting the travelers’ activities, that is, letting them know that they were being watched, would expose the operation and that would amount to its failure even if it helped stop potentially dangerous activities. But what better way to deter terrorists than to let them know that their activities are being monitored, that they are being watched and that they will be dealt with? Ironically, the CIA’s embrace of secret ops empowers those they are surveilling.

 

But because successful operations are defined as secret ops, such disruptive activities are unacceptable. Thus, the CIA’s embrace of secrecy, of secret operations undermined that agency’s ability to prevent attacks in the US. And that secrecy probably undermined the FBI’s ability to protect the US as well.

 

And so it goes: The secrecy trap.