Defeat

  

Defeat

Peter Schultz

 

                  The following are reflections spurred by a reading of D. Michael Shafer’s book, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US Counterinsurgency Policy.

 

                  As Shafer summarizes the realist explanation of US involvement in Vietnam, “Communist expansion threatened Vietnam; if Vietnam fell … other countries would … follow; this would damage America’s security and credibility as an ally. Thus, the United States had to stand in Vietnam.” [240-41]

 

                  Yes, the problem was Communist expansion, but it was not simply because it threatened Vietnam, but also and more importantly because it threatened the established elites who were governing the United States. It might even expose “the myth of invincibility,” as Dean Rusk put it, which was the basis of the claim to rule by those elites.

 

                  As one senior official put it: “We must avoid harmful appearances which will affect judgments by … other nations regarding the US … power, resolve and competence to deal with their problems…. It is essential – however badly [Southeast Asia] may go … - that the US … kept [ its] promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and hurt [and been hurt by] the enemy very badly.” [241] Getting bloodied, getting US troops killed, being hurt badly by the enemy demonstrated that US elites deserved to rule.

 

                  Take note: the primary goal was to “avoid harmful appearances,” not necessarily or primarily winning the war. And to avoid such appearances, it was necessary for the US to engage in a “War of Liberation … [which was] costly, dangerous, and doomed to failure.” [Dean Rusk, 241] To maintain and fortify their claim to rule, US elites had to show resolve, not quit, even or especially because the war was “costly, dangerous, and doomed to failure.”

 

So, ironically, what happened in Vietnam was not nearly as important as what happened in the United States; that is, what US elites were willing to do to maintain and fortify their claims to rule, even or especially to the point of undertaking futile policies. That counterinsurgency policies were not successful was not, in the final analysis, a sufficient reason to abandon them. In fact, as things went from bad to worse in Vietnam, the ruling elites would double down on such policies as a way of proving their bona fides.