The Politics of Scandal

  

The Politics of Scandals

Peter Schultz

 

                  Scandals are common in politics, so it is worthwhile to speculate about them and their relationship to what Aristotle labeled “regimes.”

 

                  For example, do scandals fortify the status quo or not? Conventionally speaking, scandals are understood as threatening the status quo or the existing regime and, yet, we have experienced what have been called “teflon presidents,” and currently have a president who has bragged that he is virtually immune from the bad effects of scandalous behavior. Insofar as Trump is correct, what does this tell us about scandals and politics? That scandals are not as dangerous as they are often thought to be, is this just the result of successful cover-ups or is something else going on here?

 

                  It is possible that scandals do not controversialize regimes; that is, they fit in regimes in ways that fortify the status quo by hiding the controversial character of a regime, of any regime. For example, how did people feel as the Watergate scandal occurred? As it was revealed, they were relieved as reflected by President Ford’s comment after Nixon resigned that “Our national nightmare is over.” So, whatever had happened during Watergate, it did not make Americans doubt the existing regime, their way of life politically. “Dirty tricks” were part of the American regime. Certainly, Nixon’s actions were shocking, but this did not lead to dissatisfaction with how America did politics. Watergate was more like a horror movie: Shocking behavior, to be sure, but not dangerously delusional social behavior that called into question how we live as a people or as a nation.

 

                  And so, there are two responses to scandals: one is covering up and the other is exposing and punishing the responsible parties. So, cover ups become normal behavior, even when they don’t make much sense, and investigations end up looking for “smoking guns,” i.e., for individual culpability or criminality. Very few are upset by cover ups because it is what culpable, criminal individuals always do, are expected to do.

 

                  Ironically then, turning something into a scandal is the first step for fortifying the established regime. It is a rather safe bet that almost every scandal will result in a reinforcement, a fortification of the established regime, of the status quo. In fact, there is nothing like a good scandal for fortifying the existing regime, the prevailing way of life.

 

                  If you doubt this, ask yourself: Why did Richard Nixon become an “elder statesman,” one that presidents should consult politically? Or: Why is Tony Blair now being taken as someone to consult about war? Ditto for George W. Bush and others.

 

                  Like so much else in politics, scandals are often disguises that blind us to the real character of the political, which is an arena characterized by smoke and mirrors that hide the fact that force and fraud are intrinsic to politics. As Machiavelli pointed out, those who “learn to be able not to be good” are the most successful politicians, even the most successful human beings. So, remarkably, many have risen to great heights politically despite scandals. And this is one reason why the political and the ironic have been said to go together very well. Understanding politics requires expertise, to be sure. But it also requires a sense of humor.