Incompetence and Politics

 

Incompetence and Politics

Peter Schultz

 

                  John Paul Vann, a leading figure during the Vietnam War who dissented from the conventional wisdom regarding that war, proposed that the Americans, if they took over the war, could reform the Vietnamese military, thereby winning that war.

 

                  But what if it was the Americans and their incompetence that was losing that war? So, instead of the conventional wisdom being that “the war couldn’t be won,” the truth would be that “the Americans couldn’t win the war” because of their incompetence, an incompetence hidden behind the humongous, overwhelmingly powerful national security state of the United States.

 

                  A common thought is that progress and incompetence are incompatible, that progress is proof of competence. But what if, for example, the development of the United States into the powerful and prosperous nation it has become serves to hide an intrinsic incompetence among US elites? By this view, the existence of slavery in the United States contributed to development of the United States into a great nation, as well as hiding the incompetence that accompanied the development of that greatness. Perhaps progress and incompetence often go hand-in-hand, and, thanks in large part to slavery, the US progressed despite its incompetence.

 

                  By this view, incompetence is a key variable of American politics. So, because this phenomenon must be hidden, duplicity becomes the coin of the realm, so to speak. And centrality of incompetence appears repeatedly, for example, in Vietnam, on 9/11, in Bush’s invasion of Iraq, in Obama’s war in Afghanistan, in Cuba, Libya, Ukraine, as well as in systemic failures such as mass incarceration, the immigration crisis, the border crisis, and repeated economic failures.

 

                  Could It be that incompetence is more pronounced, more important in the political arena than, say, corruption? Could it be more important, more decisive than, say, venality? In fact, could it be that focusing on venality is a way of hiding the incompetence, the intrinsic incompetence of our elites? And insofar as that incompetence is due to the ignorance of our elites, it cuts deeper into their claims that they are legitimate rulers because ignorance, when unrecognized, is easily hidden behind claims of expertise, moral decency, or patriotic fervor. The war in Vietnam was waged by a US military that relied on large amounts of “intelligence” or data about their war, as well as claims of being fervent US patriots. Under these claims of data-driven expertise and of being committed patriots, the incompetence of the military and political elites pretty much disappeared. Even the Pentagon Papers focused on the duplicity of these elites without indicating that that duplicity was covering up a pervasive incompetence. Perhaps then it would be advisable to focus not so much on “the character issue,” as on “the incompetence issue.” Incompetent experts and incompetent patriots are problematic in ways that overwhelming power cannot offset.  

What Was the Vietnam War?

 

What Was the Vietnam War?

Peter Schultz

 

                  What was the Vietnam War? Was it a “mistake” or was it a “culmination?’ That is, was it an aberration that could be blamed on certain personalities or certain theories, such as “the domino theory?” Or was it the culmination of decades of American foreign policy that was traceable to the most basic features of the American political order? How you answer this question goes a long way to explaining how you understand politics and the political.

 

                  Many, maybe even most people like to think that the Vietnam War and America’s other wars, e.g., in Iraq or Afghanistan, were distinct or peculiar events best understood by experts who have studied them. But what if the Vietnam War – and other wars – were integral to the most basic features of the American political order, what might be called America’s “regime?” As such intrinsic events, changing personnel, either partisans or bureaucratic, would not change them, except perhaps marginally. Even those with pacifistic tendencies would, if they acquired power, find themselves driven toward war because that is what the regime needed and facilitated. There would be no “Vietnam syndrome,” that is, no syndrome peculiar to the Vietnam War. Insofar as there were syndromes, they would more appropriately be labelled “American syndromes”, and they could not be dealt with unless the basic political order was changed. And such changes would require being radical, that is, going to the roots of the established order. Changing presidents or changing policies would be of very little usefulness in rearranging the established order in the United States.

 

                  Such radicalism will rarely prevail because, well, because it is radical and, as such, would be opposed by the most prominent, most authoritative, and most powerful components of the established order. Those who are empowered and honored by the established order are unlikely to see the need or have any desire for changing it. After all, it worked for them, identifying them as being the most virtuous Americans. They were successful. As such, they would be identified as “the best and the brightest.” That is, they are the best that the established order has to offer.

 

                  But, ironically, by electing, honoring, and empowering the best and the brightest, the failures of established order would be not only maintained but fortified. And these failures would need to be covered over, hidden, disappeared. A politics of duplicity will be necessary and would become the coin of the realm, so to speak.

 

Regarding the Vietnam War, JFK practiced duplicity to try to end America’s war there, while LBJ practiced duplicity to make the war there an American war. And Nixon practiced duplicity for four years in order to achieve “peace with honor” and end America’s involvement there, at the cost of more than 20,000 American soldiers and over at least several hundred thousand Vietnamese. And for that deadly duplicity, Henry Kissinger was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize and Nixon was reelected in one of the greatest landslides in American history. Both achieved, at least temporarily, greatness and the established order was maintained and fortified. Ironically, however, that meant that more “Vietnams” were guaranteed, as indeed has proven to be the case.

 

And so it goes. While mistakes were made by the United States that contributed to its embrace of war in Vietnam, General Giap was more correct when he asserted it was America’s imperialism that led to its tragedy in Vietnam.

The Trial of Oliver North

 

The Trial of Oliver North

Peter Schultz

 

                  It is important to understand how the trial of Oliver North, and others, were part of a cover up regarding Iran-Contra. But it is important to understand that what was being covered up was that the default position, so to speak, of politics and government is failure. This is always what needs to be covered up. And turning politicians and bureaucrats (both civilian and military) into criminals serves that cause. How and why? At least two reasons.

 

                  Criminals like North can claim, quite truthfully, that they were well-intentioned. This is what North did, turning himself into a hero when he testified before Congress. But in fact, almost all criminals are well-intentioned insofar as, ala’ Tony Soprano or Michael Corleone, they do what they do for their own well-being and the well-being of their families and their friends. Malcolm Little, as small-time hood, was a better American, seeking status, wealth, and some excitement, than he was after he became Malcolm X, black revolutionary seeking to change American politics and society.

 

                  In the movie, Traffic, there is a revealing scene where the father and the boyfriend are looking for the father’s daughter in the ghetto. The father remarks how shocking life is in the ghetto, but the boyfriend shuts him up by pointing out that the social and economic order worked quite well for those involved, so well that if it were transported to the father’s toney neighborhood, young people would adopt it readily, and give up “going to law school” and other such endeavors. In other words, ghetto youths and wealthy youths are not all that different as they have the same motivations, the same intentions and, so, their alleged differences are not real. They are contrived to justify a War on Drugs.

 

                  Secondly, criminals are arrested, charged, and tried for certain activities, which means that they actually did somethings, did them successfully. Their actions are criminal, but they accomplished things, e.g., they built Las Vegas, they created vast and immensely wealthy drug cartels composed of huge economies and powerful players. Being a criminal means being competent. Whereas Reagan, North, Bush, et. al., were, as politicians, incompetent as they achieved via Iran Contra virtually nothing. Charging or treating them as criminals hides their incompetence, their failures.

 

                  So, politicians and bureaucrats must practice deception in order to hide their incompetence. But, more importantly, they must practice deception to hide the fact that failure is the default position of politics and government. Why is that so? Because the political arena is composed of the real and the contrived, of the real and the fantastical, of the real and the illusionary.

 

                  Take the War on Drugs: The drugs are real, but the dealers and users are not real. That is, they are real people, but they are not the people we think they are. As Traffic illustrates, the users are members of our own families and, so, as Michael Douglas’s character says when he quits being drug czar, a war on drugs is actually a war on our families and he didn’t want or know how to do that.

 

                  Or consider the war in Vietnam. Vietnam was real but South Vietnam was not. It was not a real country with a real government or a real army. South Vietnam was an American fantasy, an illusion, which led American elites to be delusional, cruelly delusional.

 

                  When you deal in illusions, you are bound to fail or to make things worse. It is difficult to call the Vietnam war “pro-American” because it left the United States demoralized and weaker militarily and economically than it had been before the US took over the war. Ditto the War on Drugs, which led to a war on families and to mass incarceration, which gave the United States to one of the largest prison populations, per capita, on the planet. If that’s success, it is a strange definition of success. It certainly should not be described as “pro-American.”

 

                  And how was the Vietnam war “anti-Communist” when the North Vietnamese economy actually grew during the American bombing campaigns? Moreover, the war solidified the relations between the Vietnamese, the Russians, and the Chinese, thereby unifying the Communist “world.” And the Chinese and the Russians sacrificed exactly zero soldiers in that war. Again, if that is considered successful “anti-Communism,” it is a strange definition of success.

 

                  These are the failures that need to be covered up. More importantly, the fact that failure is default position of the political, that failure in intrinsic to politics must be covered up. It would be quite significant if people realized that despite them thinking that ordinarily politics succeeds, the reverse was the case, viz., that politics and government ordinarily fail.

 

                  Consider two books in this regard: Why Empires Always Fail and Seeing Like a State. The former points out, with a wide-ranging history of empires, both ancient and recent, that empires always fail and always are based on and embrace inhuman cruelty. The latter points out that government projects almost never succeed and certainly don’t succeed without extraneous, i.e., unplanned measures occurring.

 

                  By criminalizing Ollie North, the establishment allowed him to successfully play the role of hero and to appear as something other than an incompetent, shallow Marine. And that, of course, is how we don’t want to think of our warrior Marines. It would be too revealing. But, more importantly, criminalizing North was a way to hide the fact that the default position of politics is failure. And this is, perhaps, the most important cover-up of all.

LBJ, Nixon, and Vietnam

 

LBJ, Nixon, and Vietnam

Peter Schultz

 

                  As David Halberstam put it in his book The Best and the Brightest, “he [LBJ] could not make the next step … the liquidation of [the war] politically.” [659]

 

                  Why not? Because this was a big step, a radical step and LBJ could not go to the roots of his politics, the roots of his delusions. He was blind to the fundamental flaws of his politics, e.g., how his politics privileged “toughness” and not wisdom or even competence, as competence and wisdom require an awareness of limits, a sense of irony, if you please.

 

                  Nixon was in the same boat. His continuation of the war wasn’t only or even primarily about his winning re-election in 1972, as argued in Fatal Politics, a most worthwhile book. His savagery had political roots, roots which Nixon always affirmed. So, for Nixon, Vietnam and the war was “not a compelling tragedy … it was an issue like others, something to maneuver on….” [661] As a result, “To an extraordinary degree … Nixon … repeated the mistakes and miscalculations of the Johnson Administration…. Nixon saw South Vietnam as a real country with a real President and a real army, rich in political legitimacy, and … capable of performing [as] demanded by American aims and rhetoric.” [665]

 

                  So, contra Fatal Politics, Nixon wasn’t shrewdly maneuvering in Nam to ensure his re-election. No, he was “in a position of not being able to win, not being able to get out, not being able to get our prisoners home, only being able to lash out and bomb.” [665] Nixon/Kissinger were trapped – by their politics – just as LBJ, et. al., had been trapped. Nixon “still believed in [the] essential mission….” [664] Nixon/Kissinger were just as blind as LBJ had been, as JFK had been, as Eisenhower and Truman had been. They all believed in “the essential mission” as it was understood post-WW II, viz., that US hegemony would save the world by bringing it peace, prosperity, and freedom. Such were the prevailing delusions that led to the Vietnam War. But as David Halberstam wrote, that as the war went on, “Americans were finding, [there was] no light at the end of the tunnel, only greater darkness.” [665] Sounds like a finding worth repeating, especially these days.

Government Deception

 

Government Deception

Peter Schultz

 

So ironic: to read this critique [in Walsh’s book Firewall] of “government by deception” as if there’s any other kind of government! This is a wonderful illustration of how Walsh’s team and function, during the Iran-Contra scandal, participated in and facilitated, unknowingly perhaps, the real cover up, that is, the cover up of the political, and it’s intrinsic incompetence, futility, and injustice. All of these investigations and no one asked:  What was accomplished? Or more to the point: Why was so little accomplished?

 

By trying North, e.g., Walsh et. al. Implied he had actually accomplished something, that he had done something! As a criminal, ala’ Walsh et. al., North could appear to be a hero when he was just incompetent! Incompetence isn’t criminal; it isn’t much of anything! North wasn’t a hero; he was an incompetent asshole. But then we can’t have our warrior Marines seen as incompetent assholes, can we? That would be too revealing!

 

[By the by, the same applies to Nixon’s behavior in Watergate: he wasn’t a criminal; he was just another incompetent asshole! Criminalizing Nixon hid his incompetence and made him look competent, thereby covering up the incompetence that’s intrinsic to politics and government.] 

 

So it goes! 

 

Unitary Executive

 

Unitary Executive

Peter Schultz

 

Issue posed by Cheney, et. al.: Is the “unitary executive” constitutional? This question ignores or covers up the question, Is a unitary executive politically beneficial? The most important guestion isn’t,  does it exist, but is should it exist? 

 

Cheney et. al. argued that presidents can’t do their jobs unless there is a unitary executive. In other words, the “centralization of authority in … presidents alone is … crucial….” 

 

But this is true only for a particular conception of the president’s “job.” Centralization of authority only makes sense given a particular conception of president’s job. If the president’s job isn’t domination, then the centralization of authority in that office doesn’t make sense. And, of course, if domination is illusionary, both as a fact and as a good thing, then the centralization of authority ought to be rejected because it will lead to failure. If the political is a madhouse, and domination of it is illusionary, then what Cheney, et. al., take as an unalloyed good thing, centralization of executive authority, will lead to failure over and over again, e.g., in Vietnam, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Ukraine, in Cuba, in the Middle East, in Latin America, etc., etc., etc. 

 

Ironically, it was during the covert centralization of executive authority in the Reagan Administration that the failures that made up what is called Iran-Contra came to be. But this was successfully covered up by the Congressional investigations and by the OIC under Walsh. Put differently, it was imperialism and imperialistic policies that led to the Iran-Contra failures. Why? Because although imperialism looks politically beneficial, it isn’t. In fact, like the political itself, it’s madness. This is what needed to be covered up in Iran-Contra, in Vietnam, in Iraq and Afghanistan, etc.

 

And if you can transform imperialists into criminals, ala’ as was done to Nixon during Watergate and as Walsh tried to do with North and Poindexter, then you can successfully cover up the madness of imperialism and of the political. Nixon, as a criminal, became the scapegoat who was used to cover up the madness of imperialism and of the political. (An article of impeachment that dealt with Nixon’s actions in Southeast Asia, i.e., with his imperialistic politics, was voted down in the House of Representatives.) Ditto regarding the criminalization of North and Poindexter. 

US Politics: Delusional Incompetence

 

US Politics: Delusional Incompetence

Peter Schultz

 

                  The following is from David Halberstam’s book The Best and the Brightest, wherein it is clear that the best and the brightest Americans failed in Vietnam.

 

“As in China, it was a modern army against a feudal one, though it was not perceived by Western eyes, particularly Western military eyes, which saw the ARVN was well equipped, with radios, airplanes, artillery and fighter planes, and that the Vietcong had virtually nothing, except light artillery pieces. Western observers believed the reverse, believed that the ARVN was a legitimate and real army, and that the Vietcong, more often than not wearing black pajamas, not even uniformed, were the fake army, the unreal one – why, they did not even have a chain of command. It was ironic; the United States had created an army in its own image, an army which existed primarily on paper, and which was linked to U.S. aims and ambitions and no way reflected its own society. We believed in the army, the South Vietnamese did not…. [There was an] illusion about a dynamic new leadership that would persist relentlessly through the years….”  [167]

 

                  Americans were delusionally incompetent, blinded by their power and deluded by it. Losing in Vietnam was “unthinkable” for Americans and, so, after they lost, that loss had to be disappeared. Amazingly, Nixon’s Peace with Honor was accepted as a kind of victory, even after the “North” Vietnamese took over and renamed Saigon “Ho Chi Minh City.”