The Ambiguity of Moral Virtue

  

The Ambiguity of Moral Virtue

Peter Schultz

 

                  As noted in the book, Patriotic Betrayal, there was a time in the United States when “neutrality [was viewed] as ‘immoral and short-sighted.,’ by both liberal and conservative Cold Warriors.” [145]

 

                  Now, if we grant that neutrality is, actually, immoral or amoral, as thought by “both liberal and conservative Cold Warriors,” then these Cold Warriors were, in fact, moral human beings. But this means that these moral human beings accepted and embraced war, both cold and hot.

 

                  A question occurs to me: Isn’t this a good argument on behalf of immorality insofar as it is pacifistic, insofar as it points toward peace or peaceful coexistence, and not to war? Ironically, it would appear that immoral human beings are less warlike than moral human beings. Put differently, courageous human beings are more warlike than cowardly human beings. So, what’s so great about courage?

 

                  In other words, courage – and moral virtue generally – has ambiguous consequences, just as does cowardice and immorality generally. So, what’s needed? Intellectual virtue: that is, the capacity to discern when courage makes more sense than cowardice and when cowardice – e.g. “appeasement” – makes more sense than courage. The fact that neutrality was immoral was not necessarily an argument against it, at least not during the Cold War. And the fact that the Cold Warriors were moral need not lead to their endorsement or the endorsement of the Cold War itself. Ironically, at times, a little immorality goes a long way.