LBJ, Nixon, and Vietnam

 

LBJ, Nixon, and Vietnam

Peter Schultz

 

                  As David Halberstam put it in his book The Best and the Brightest, “he [LBJ] could not make the next step … the liquidation of [the war] politically.” [659]

 

                  Why not? Because this was a big step, a radical step and LBJ could not go to the roots of his politics, the roots of his delusions. He was blind to the fundamental flaws of his politics, e.g., how his politics privileged “toughness” and not wisdom or even competence, as competence and wisdom require an awareness of limits, a sense of irony, if you please.

 

                  Nixon was in the same boat. His continuation of the war wasn’t only or even primarily about his winning re-election in 1972, as argued in Fatal Politics, a most worthwhile book. His savagery had political roots, roots which Nixon always affirmed. So, for Nixon, Vietnam and the war was “not a compelling tragedy … it was an issue like others, something to maneuver on….” [661] As a result, “To an extraordinary degree … Nixon … repeated the mistakes and miscalculations of the Johnson Administration…. Nixon saw South Vietnam as a real country with a real President and a real army, rich in political legitimacy, and … capable of performing [as] demanded by American aims and rhetoric.” [665]

 

                  So, contra Fatal Politics, Nixon wasn’t shrewdly maneuvering in Nam to ensure his re-election. No, he was “in a position of not being able to win, not being able to get out, not being able to get our prisoners home, only being able to lash out and bomb.” [665] Nixon/Kissinger were trapped – by their politics – just as LBJ, et. al., had been trapped. Nixon “still believed in [the] essential mission….” [664] Nixon/Kissinger were just as blind as LBJ had been, as JFK had been, as Eisenhower and Truman had been. They all believed in “the essential mission” as it was understood post-WW II, viz., that US hegemony would save the world by bringing it peace, prosperity, and freedom. Such were the prevailing delusions that led to the Vietnam War. But as David Halberstam wrote, that as the war went on, “Americans were finding, [there was] no light at the end of the tunnel, only greater darkness.” [665] Sounds like a finding worth repeating, especially these days.