The Uses and Limitations of Secrecy and Duplicity

 

The Uses and Limitations of Secrecy and Duplicity

Peter Schultz

 

                  James Rosen’s biography of John Mitchell, The Strong Man: John Mitchell and the Secrets of Watergate illustrates that secrecy and duplicity are intrinsic to politics and that they are both useful and harmful. Rosen seems to think that it was secrecy and duplicity that brought Nixon down, without realizing that secrecy and duplicity are intrinsic to politics. To wit:

 

“The two [Nixon and Kissinger] had come full circle. Less than two weeks after learning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff spying – a ‘lesion’ Nixon admitted having created with his and Kissinger’s incessant back-channel plotting – the president had blithely resumed scheming with his national security advisor, whom he had … described as ‘not a good security risk,’ to use the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a back channel to circumvent the secretary of defense.” [179-80]

 

                  “Had Liddy forsaken the code of omerta, the testimony of Dean and Magruder against Mitchell would have crumbled.” [262]

 

                  “Mitchell harbored few illusions about Haig, whom he came to consider ‘a power grabber …  pleased to abandon Nixon to maintain his power base in Washington and the military.’  Shown the transcript of the Ehrlichman-Welander interrogation many years later, the former attorney general declared that had Nixon seen it, he would never have appointed Haig … as chief of staff. Had that happened, of course, historians would never have had to grapple … with …  questions about Haig’s conduct – and loyalties – in the latter stages of Watergate: the disclosure of Nixon’s taping system, the origins and discovery of the eighteen-and-a-half-minute gap, the pardon.

 

“Thus, by the time he died, Mitchell realized his burial of the Moorer-Radford scandal  –  undertaken to spare the nation a court martial involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to give Nixon a ‘whip hand’ over them  –  effectually sealed the president’s own fate. By allowing men he distrusted, and who distrusted him, to remain in place in the White House and at the Pentagon, Nixon ensured that the cultural secrecy and paranoia that infused his first term persisted until the Watergate scandal aborted his presidency.” [175-176]

 

Secrecy and duplicity permeated the Nixon administration but then they are intrinsic to politics, and they flourish in the political arena, even more so, apparently, than the likes of Nixon and Mitchell were aware. Mitchell may have harbored few illusions about Haig as “a power grabber,” but he did harbor illusions about the political. As Machiavelli might have counseled him, Mitchell needed to be dis-llusioned by learning that persons like Haig, who seem most committed to seeking the good, are actually seeking power and fame.  In that way then, Mitchell might have learned the lesson Machiavelli emphasized most heavily, viz., “to learn to be able not to be good.”