Watergate: A Morality Tale Without No Morality
Peter Schultz
To understand
the Watergate scandal, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that John
Dean, in November of 1971, had his assistant, John Caulfield, tell Anthony Ulasewicz,
another Dean underling, to walk through the Democratic National Headquarters
offices in the Watergate office building. This order made little sense to Ulasewicz,
and it has made little sense to most other people who have noticed it. For
example, Gordon Liddy never understood why Dean wanted to break into and bug these
offices. But Dean had a reason for doing so and it is key to understanding what
became the Watergate scandal.
Dean was
then in a relationship with Mo Biner, the woman who later became his wife. And
Mo was friends with a woman whose real name was Erika L. “Heidi” Rikan,
otherwise known as Cathy Dieter. Cathy/Heidi, as she is referred to in the book
Silent Coup: The Removal of a President by Len Colodny and Robert
Gettlin, had been a stripper in Washington, D.C. from 1964 to 1966, when she
moved into management. That is, she managed a sex-for-money operation in D.C.,
which was eventually closed down. After that, she managed a sex-for-money “call
girl ring” at Columbia Plaza, which is what she was doing when she met John
Dean in the 70s, who was, as noted, dating, and living with Mo Biner, who was a
good friend of Cathy/Heidi, even staying with her when Dean was out of town.
Around
Labor Day in 1971, an attorney named Phillip Mackin Bailley, Cathy/Heide, and
Mo Biner, whose nickname in Bailley’s address book was “Clout,” met and
discussed a new opportunity for expanding Cathy/Heidi’s business, namely, a
Bailley connection who was a Democratic official housed in the Democratic
Headquarters in the Watergate office building. Bailley thought it feasible that
his contact, Spencer Oliver, or someone else at the DNC would agree to steer
visiting politicians to women who could make their evenings pleasurable. After a
couple of tries, Bailley was successful and managed to establish a contact who
would, for a commission of course, steer politicians in the direction of Columbia
Plaza and Cathy/Heidi’s women.
Two things
that are clear about John Dean is that he was quite ambitious – entitling his memoir
Blind Ambition – and that he determined early on in his office in the
White House that political intelligence, gathering and controlling it, was the
way to rise in the Nixon administration. Although later he tried to minimize
his efforts in this regard, it is fairly obvious that Dean repeatedly tried to get
approval for political intelligence operations that would prove useful and
would enhance his reputation. So, when Dean, who was “great friends” with Cathy/Heidi,
learned of the DNC connection with Heidi Rikan’s business, he knew this would
be, if tapped (couldn’t resist), a gold mine of political intelligence that
could be used to compromise Democratic politicians, thereby advancing the power
of Republicans and his own power. This was why he had Anthony Ulasewicz walk
through the DNC headquarters, to assess the feasibility of bugging those
offices in order to get damaging political intelligence on Democrats. That is,
Dean knew what no one else knew, “that valuable intelligence information could
be gleaned from the DNC.” It was opportunity an ambitious fellow like Dean
would not pass up, especially as he had the personnel and the means to covertly
enter the DNC and bug its phones and offices.
The problem
was – and it was or would become a big problem – that there was another agency
that knew of and was taking an active interest in the call girl ring at Columbia
Plaza, and that other agency was the CIA. For some time, the CIA had engaged in
such clandestine spying in order to discover and record politicians in
compromising situations. The CIA’ interests in this regard was two-fold: To
draw up what it called “machines” or psychological profiles of politicians so
it could predict what they would do and, perhaps, influence their doings as well.
In fact, the CIA was involved in such clandestine activities with regard to the
Columbia Plaza call girl ring, which included as “johns” some of the most
prominent political and social persons in the D.C. area, including some judges
and even a senator.
Well, you
can see the problem that Dean ran into. His operation to spy on the Democrats
and the Columbia Plaza call girl ring could and probably would in all
likelihood expose the CIA’s operation, which was of course illegal. Therefore,
Dean’s operation had to be stopped, had to be undermined, which was made
possible by the presence of at least two CIA assets working in the Nixon administration,
E. Howard Hunt and James McCord, both of whom claimed to have left the CIA.
But, of course, they hadn’t done that and by making “mistake” after “mistake,” making
the burglary look like “a third-rate burglary,” as the Nixon people described
it, the burglars were caught red-handed, as it were. And then with an assist
from McCord, who wrote to Judge Sirica to say perjury had been and was being
committed, the attempted cover-up failed and, eventually, Richard Nixon was
forced to resign as the Watergate operation, an operation initiated by John Dean,
was seen as part of a broader attack on America’s democracy. That this alleged
attack on America’s democracy was subverted by the CIA acting secretly should
lead one to question the conventional understanding of Watergate as a morality
tale wherein democratic heroes from the Washington Post and elsewhere road to
rescue of American democracy.
In fact, if
this was a morality tale, it was one where no one acted morally. John Dean’s
attempt at a cover-up could be seen as his attempt to protect the honor or reputation
of his love, Mo Biner, but of course that love and her honor didn’t stop him
from undertaking a covert operation that, if exposed, would have compromised
her reputation and honor as well, and all for the sake of satisfying his “blind
ambition.” The CIA did not, unsurprisingly, act morally, as it gathered
intelligence it could use to compromise politicians, thereby undermining
democracy. Nor did Nixon and his administration act morally. Indeed, if Nixon
had acted morally, that is, had he actually tried to discover what the burglary
was about, and who was responsible, instead of covering it up, he would have
saved his presidency and come out “smelling like a rose.” Nor did Nixon’s
enemies act morally, as they proved willing to ignore aspects of the situation
that would have lessened their animosity toward Nixon and compromised their
desires to destroy him politically. But a morality play needs “good guys” and “bad
guys,” and so Watergate continues to be seen through the eyes of those who were
allegedly the “good guys.” And it is quite remarkable how many flaws get covered
up by designating someone one of “good guys.”