The Kennedy Assassination as Ordinary Politics

  

The Kennedy Assassination as Ordinary Politics

Peter Schultz

 

                  The following passages are from Peter Dale Scott’s book “Deep Politics and the Death of JFK.” It is interesting, though, that the idea of “deep politics” isn’t needed to explain JFK’s assassination.

 

                  “…I propose that most hypotheses of the Kennedy assassination hitherto, whether the designated culprits have been Communists or Minutemen, the CIA or the Mafia, have suffered a common defect. This is to look for an external conspiracy violating a systemic political order from without.

 

                  “We shall offer an enlarged and deeper perspective of power as a symbiosis of public government, organized crime, and private wealth with deep connections to both government and crime. From this perspective, the forces behind the assassination no longer appear as extraneous, but as deeply systemic; and the violation of the enlarged power system can be seen as coming from the Kennedys, with their policies of détente abroad and an attack on a CIA-sanctioned Hoffa crime connection at home. From this perspective, the assassination was not a corrupt attack from outside an honest system. The assassination was a desperate, extraordinary defense, or adjustment, of a system that was itself corrupt.” [74]

 

                  There is some ambiguity here. For example, was the assassination “a desperate, extraordinary defense” or was it an “adjustment?” If the latter, then to speak of it as “desperate” and “extraordinary” is misleading. Adjustments are just that, a rearranging of some things not involving “desperate” or “extraordinary” measures. But, overall, insofar as Scott is correct that the assassination was the product of well established and generally legitimate forces, then the assassination can be described as ordinary or “systematized” politics. Of course, assassinations are not common political moves, but they are far from uncommon, even in the United States. Lincoln assassinated, Garfield assassinated, McKinley was assassinated, Teddy Roosevelt was wounded, and there was an attempt to assassinate FDR, while Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan were both targets, and Reagan was actually wounded. Of course, most recently there was an attempt to assassinate Donald Trump. And this list is only concerned with presidents, leaving out the assassinations of Huey Long, of Malcolm X, of Martin Luther King, Jr., of Fred Hampton, of Medgar Evans, and Charlie Kirk.

 

                  But although Scott’s very good research points him toward the view that the Kennedy assassination, like politics generally, was a more banal event than is generally recognized, being an “adjustment” of the existing political order, Scott, like many others, finds it difficult not to be melodramatic about JFK’s assassination. One problem with Scott’s melodrama is that it obscures the character of the political, viz., that politics is, for the most part and at its core, banal, involving constant and, for the most part, adjustments to the existing order. There is not and there will never be a New Frontier, a Great Society, or an end to terrorism.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Secrecy, Government, and Politics

  

Secrecy, Government, and Politics

Peter Schultz

 

                  Secrecy is integral, even intrinsic to government and politics because it affords (and preserves) the illusion of power. It preserves the illusion of being in control – until it doesn’t.

 

                  Consider this passage from John Newman’s JFK and Vietnam, about the duplicitous lengths the US went to preserve the illusion of control.

 

                  “This, then, is how the intricate cover story to hide the order authorizing US aircraft to shoot down Soviet planes over Vietnam was put together. It seems tragic, somehow, that the disparate bureaucracy in Washington, Honolulu, and Saigon could come together with such efficiency, coordination, and energy to fine-tune a false cover story, and yet work with the agility and pace of a turtle on the true problems of the war. Unfortunately, controlling the public impression of the war consumed an inordinate amount of command attention.” [215]

 

                  Take note: an “intricate cover story … was put together.” So, much time and effort were devoted to this story indicating that it was important, even crucial stuff. Why? Because such a story was indispensable for disguising what was actually happening in Vietnam and indicating that the US was not in control to the extent that it was shooting down Soviet planes. That the US had to shoot down Soviet planes was a good indication that the US was not in control and, so, this policy had to kept secret.

 

                  Take note: the story was “fine-tuned.” And great care was given to it as it was being “put together.” Note too should be made that there were no objections to this duplicity. While some details may have created some controversy, the duplicitous actions were accepted as legitimate by all those who were involved, including of course the President. Hence, “the inordinate amount of command attention” was not inordinate for those involved. It was what they did and what they were convinced should be done. It, the duplicity, was the right thing.

 

                  Government officials and politicians are always, i.e., intrinsically duplicitous. This is a fact of life, so to speak. And it is a fact of life for the powerful, the decision-makers, those acting politically, socially, militarily, and economically. It is how they preserve the illusion(s) of control, thereby legitimating and fortifying their claim to rule. But that duplicity is demanded by the lack of control, which does not exist to the extent these powerful persons think it does. The reality of this lack of control confirms the presence and power of chance, a power denied by modern science, both physical and political. And chance is pervasive, so much so that “The deception had become integral to the routine, so much a part of the way business was carried on … that no one … noticed when a fiction of a different sort emerged, a deception within a deception … directed at the President himself.” [219]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

More Irony in Iraq

  

More Irony in Iraq

Peter Schultz

 

                  The following is from James Bamford’s book A Pretext for War:

 

                  “It wasn’t just the small dumps that got overlooked; the United States also failed to secure Iraq’s single largest ammo dump, known as Al QaQaa…. After examining the bunkers, the troops simply left the doors open…. The looters and future insurgents wasted little time stripping the base. After learning of the problem in May 2003, an internal IAEA memorandum [alerted] Washington that terrorists might be in the process of helping ‘themselves to the greatest explosive bonanza in history.’ The White House, however, ignored the warning. Thus, intent on finding nuclear weapons that didn’t exist, Washington ignored the real weapons that did exist.

 

                  “Through such actions and inactions, the Bush administration turned Iraq into a grizzly death factory for Americans and innocent Iraqi men, women, and children. Its invasion created the insurgency, its brutal occupation kept it growing, and its utter lack of planning and foresight armed with a virtually unlimited supply of powerful weapons. This makes for bitter irony. The Bush administration invaded Iraq in large part to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists. Now because of its invasion and lack of planning, the Bush administration is responsible for weapons of mass destruction going into the hands of terrorists…. The result is a seemingly endless downward spiral.”  [400-403, emphasis added]

 

                  As some have argued, the political is the realm of the ironic. Obviously, the Bush administration and its leading neoconservatives had no appreciation for the ironical character of their war in Iraq. Had they been aware of the ironical character of their politics, had they had, that is, a more developed sense of humor, they would neither have failed so badly nor killed so many people.

 

 

The Idealism of the Realists

  

The Idealism of the Realists

Peter Schultz

 

                  The US war in Iraq illustrates as well as anything can just how idealistic our alleged “realists” are and need to be to justify their wars.

 

                  They are idealistic, first, in thinking that their intelligence is accurate, and, so, must be believed and acted upon. Without such idealizing of intelligence, the Iraq invasion would never have happened. Because the “intelligence community” (note the idealism in that phrase!) determined that Iraq had WMDs, Iraq had to have such weapons. It was “a slam duck,” to quote George Tenet of the CIA. If actually viewed realistically, however, any such intelligence should have been treated skeptically.

 

                  Our realists were idealistic in how they thought the war would unfold, as well as its aftermath. The war would be over quickly, using minimal number of ground forces, the Iraqi people would rise up and thankfully embrace the American forces and America, Iraq would then create a working democracy, and in the war’s aftermath the Middle East would be remade to the advantage of Israel and the United States. It is difficult to think of a more idealistic scenario for Iraq. All of “it” would work out, just as realists said it would at the Bay of Pigs, in Korea, and in Vietnam, to name a few other wars our idealistic realists embraced.

 

                  It is the height of irony to call those advancing and embracing the Iraq war “realists.” Maybe this explains why some people have called the political arena intrinsically ironic. And why the political cannot be understood without a sense of irony, i.e., without a sense of humor. Insofar as our “realists” need anything, it is a sense of humor. The lack thereof explains why realism and realists so often fail.

Secrecy and the Powerful

  

Secrecy and the Powerful

Peter Schultz

 

                  Secrecy is popular with the powerful because it protects them from being seen as failures, and failure is one thing that the powerful seek, mightily, to avoid. Avoiding or hiding failure might be even more important to the powerful than succeeding because failure undermines how the powerful want and need to be seen.

 

                  “In fact, as they later admitted, prior to September 11, 2001, ‘the CIA had no penetrations of Al Qaeda leadership, and the Agency never acquired intelligence from anyone that could be acted upon.’ It was George Tenet’s biggest secret. Not only was Al Qaeda never penetrated, neither the Counterterrorism Center nor Alec Station ever picked up a single piece of usable intelligence on bin Laden or his organization, the country’s greatest threat.” [221, Bamford]

 

                  So, secrecy helps to maintain the appearance of being powerful. So too does inactivity, which is facilitated by secrecy. Very often, in the time leading up to the attacks on September 11, 2001, secrets were learned, intelligence was revealed that was not acted upon.

 

                  “Despite the importance of the operation, Rich [Blee] had never bothered to write up and distribute an intelligence report on it - … a TD or Telegraphic Dissemination. ‘A TD would have gone to a lot of people,’ admitted the senior intelligence officer, ‘but we didn’t do that.’” [227, Bamford]

 

                  Was this conspiratorial behavior? Hardly. It was merely ordinary, run-of-the-mill behavior meant to conceal how powerless the Agency was against potential terrorists. And such behavior continued: “Despite losing the key suspects, Rich [Blee] told senior CIA officials four days later, on January 12, that the surveillance in Kuala Lumpur was continuing. Two days later he again told his superiors that they were continuing to track the Al Qaeda suspects, but by then Alec Station had no clue where Almihdhar, Alhazmi, and Khallad were, and all tracking had ceased.” [228]

 

                  Conspiratorial behavior? Hardly. And finally: “Alec Station made no further attempts to locate the missing suspected terrorists.” [228] If you don’t try to locate suspected terrorists, you can’t fail at finding them. Using secrecy as a way of avoiding or hiding failure works well, particularly for the officials involved.

 

                  Ironically, often what the powerful do to appear powerful undermines their power. The Agency and its secrecy were in fact empowering its enemies, but not conspiratorially. CIA officials were behaving normally, that is, secretly. But they were, unintentionally, colluding with Al Qaeda and its terrorists. So, it goes.

CIA Operations and US Security

  

CIA Operations and US Security

Peter Schultz

 

                  How a CIA operation compromised US security by undermining attempts to prevent attacks on the US homeland.

 

                  The CIA, specifically Alec Station, was running an operation against at least two suspected terrorists, Almihdhar and Alhazmi. It was a surveillance operation that led to Kuala Lumpur and a meeting of suspected terrorists in January 2000. Questions were raised later about whether the Agency had notified the FBI of this meeting, with the CIA saying it had done so and the FBI contending it was not notified.

 

                  It is crucial to understand CIA’s “operations,” what they are and what they aren’t to understand what happened. Alec Station said regarding its operation that “we need to continue the effort to identify these travelers and their activities … to determine if there is any true threat posed.” [Bamford, 223]

 

                  Note needs be taken of the goals of this op: to identify travelers and identify “any true threat posed” and, of course, to achieve these goals secretly. The secrecy is why no thought was ever given to disrupting the travels and activities of these suspects. Besides, that was not “the op,” not the job, which was to identify and understand certain things. And this would explain why the CIA would not have notified the FBI, because that would violate and might compromise the secrecy required by the operation. As an FBI agent pointed out: “They didn’t want the bureau meddling in their business [i.e., their operation] – that’s why they didn’t tell the FBI.”

 

                  It needs be emphasized that “the op.” is the thing, the CIA’s thing, the thing to be protected, held close as is said, so it could be successful. The CIA’s goal was a successful operation, which required preserving the secrecy of the operation in every way possible. Sharing intelligence with the FBI could compromise that secrecy, so it was not to be done. Disrupting the travelers’ activities, that is, letting them know that they were being watched, would expose the operation and that would amount to its failure even if it helped stop potentially dangerous activities. But what better way to deter terrorists than to let them know that their activities are being monitored, that they are being watched and that they will be dealt with? Ironically, the CIA’s embrace of secret ops empowers those they are surveilling.

 

But because successful operations are defined as secret ops, such disruptive activities are unacceptable. Thus, the CIA’s embrace of secrecy, of secret operations undermined that agency’s ability to prevent attacks in the US. And that secrecy probably undermined the FBI’s ability to protect the US as well.

 

And so it goes: The secrecy trap.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ellsberg v. Oliver Stone

  

Ellsberg v. Oliver Stone

Peter Schultz

 

                  There is a fundamental misperception regarding the Vietnam war: That the U.S. and Hanoi, et. al., wanted the war to end and were working to end the war during 1968.

 

                  Daniel Ellsberg, in his memoir, Secrets, forces us to wonder if that was the case. As Ellsberg makes clear, LBJ’s decision not to seek re-election in 1968, which he, LBJ, presented as part of his attempt to end the war, was not intended to do that. In fact, it was LBJ’s way of preserving the power of the established elites, the “cold warriors,” which would allow for continuing the war.

 

                  Hubert Humphrey, as well, could not afford to publicly seek the war’s end because “if he did declare some independence [from Johnson], ever so slightly, he faced … forms of retribution from an enraged president.” And this enragement from Johnson gives away his commitment to the war.

 

                  Hanoi, as Ellsberg points out “wasn’t acting as if it [wanted]… to get our bombing stopped or to end the war by making concessions…. Neither party was ready to make any significant concessions…. [222]

 

                  And Nixon wanted the war continued because that would help ensure his election to the presidency, which is why he worked covertly to get Thieu to reject any negotiations to end the war. And, of course, continuing the war was the key, Nixon knew, to his re-election in 1972.

 

                  So, when Oliver Stone, in his movie “Nixon,” melodramatically uses an alleged confrontation between Nixon and a young, female protester at the Lincoln Memorial to illustrate the power of “the system” – which produced a war that allegedly no one wanted – his melodrama misleads. Powerful human beings in Washington, Hanoi, and Saigon, for various reasons, wanted and saw to it that the war would go on.

 

                  So, even when “They did get into direct, formal talks, … that was what had happened: nothing. The war went on…. Thus, by itself, ‘stopping the bombing’ of the North altogether, unconditionally, permanently, was … a false issue, almost a distraction, when it came to ending the war.” [222, emphasis added]

 

                  When it came to ending the war, it did not end because the most powerful human beings did not want it to end. It was not that “the system” rendered these powerful human beings powerless. It was that these powerful human beings used their power to make war. They chose to make war, to continue to make war. So, if the war was “a quagmire,” it was a quagmire constructed, deliberately, by powerful human beings, who then used the “quagmire story” to disguise their embrace of an obscenely violent war.

 

                  And as a result of Johnson’s decision not to run in 1968 and because “we had two major candidates going around the country not talking about ending the bombing,” the war went on and even “more or less disappeared from the mainstream of American political debate as a major issue … [from] March 31,1968 to Nixon’s invasion of Cambodia on April 30, 1970.” [226] As Ellsberg points out: “The lack of public controversy … reflected a tenacious belief … that Johnson’s March 31 announcement … constituted a conscious and decisive turning point toward the prompt ending of American involvement in the war in Indochina.” [226] The lack of public controversy regarding the war was precisely what the established elites in Washington wanted because that allowed them to continue the war without threatening their power and authority by empowering antiwar activists and other left wingers. This conspiracy would be so successful in the long run that Richard Nixon would be rewarded with a historical landslide victory in the 1972 presidential election, a victory that buried the legitimacy of any left-wing political alternatives. Ultimately, that burial may be said to have made possible the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. So it goes.